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CLIMATE REGULATION OF THE 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY:  A 
COMPARATIVE VIEW  
FROM AUSTRALIA, GREAT BRITAIN, 
SOUTH KOREA, AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
Lincoln L. Davies,* Penelope Crossley,** Peter 
Connor,*** Siwon Park,**** & Shelby Shaw-Hughes***** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the face of the climate crisis, the future of the electricity 
industry is vital.  Globally, the electricity sector ranks first in terms 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for 25% of such 
emissions in 2010.1  Among Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, the figures are even 
starker:  electricity is the number one contributor to climate change 
for this group, comprising 42% of GHG emissions.2   
The trajectory of the electricity industry, moreover, is one only 
of expansion.  From the inception of the industry with the first central 
power station, on Pearl Street in New York City in 1882, through 
today, the electricity industry has only continued to grow.  This, of 
course, is a dual-edged sword.  Access to electricity improves lives in 
                                                
*  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Hugh B. Brown Endowed 
Presidential Chair in Law, and Presidential Scholar, University of Utah S.J. 
Quinney College of Law.  Many thanks to Emily Aplin and Suzanne Darais 
for research and data collection support and assistance. 
**  Senior Lecturer, The University of Sydney Law School. 
***  Senior Lecturer in Renewable Energy Policy, University of Exeter. 
**** Assistant Professor, Kangwon National University School of Law. 
***** Quinney Research Fellow, University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. 
1  IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2014, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 
2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/wg3/drafts/fgd/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-
policymakers_approved.pdf.  
2 Recent Trends in the OECD: Energy and CO2 Emissions, INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY 9 (2016), 
http://www.iea.org/media/statistics/Recent_Trends_in_the_OECD.pdf.  
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innumerable ways,3 but its broader environmental impacts can be 
deeply problematic.4  Relevant to this tension, while global access to 
electricity increased from 78% in 2008 to 84% in 2014,5 global 
demand for power grew steeply from 10,092 terawatt hours (TWh) in 
1990 to 19,562 TWh in 2012, and is expected to climb yet higher 
still, to 29,442 TWh in 2030.6 
Critically, as the electricity industry continues to grow, its shape 
is also rapidly changing.  This can be seen perhaps most prominently 
in the makeup of electricity generation worldwide.  While the use of 
fossil fuels to produce electricity rose from 63% of generation in 
1990 to 68% in 2012, that share is expected to decrease to between 
55 and 66% of global generation in 2040, depending on the policies 
                                                
3  See generally, e.g., J. Stuart McMenamin et al., Environmental 
Benefits of Electrification and End-use Efficiency, 10 ELECTRICITY J. 26 
(1997); Shonali Pachauri et al., Access to Modern Energy: Assessment and 
Outlook for Developing and Emerging Regions,  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (2012), 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/researchPrograms/Energy/IIASA-
GEF-UNIDO_Access-to-Modern-Energy_2013-05-27.pdf; B. Attigah & L. 
Mayer-Tasch, The Impact of Electricity Access on Economic Development: A 
Literature Review, PRODUSE (2013), 
http://www.produse.org/imglib/downloads/PRODUSE_study/PRODUSE%2
0Study_Literature%20Review.pdf; Randall Spalding-Fecher, Health Benefits 
of Electrification in Developing Countries: A Quantitative Assessment in 
South Africa, 9 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 53 (2005); Margaret Wilson 
et al., A New Slant on Slopes: Measuring Benefits of Increased Electricity 
Access in Developing Countries, WORLD BANK ENERGY SECTOR MGMT. 
ASSITANCE PROGRAM (Feb. 2011), 
https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/Final%20ESMAP%20Report%
20for%20grey%20cover%20February%202011_0.pdf. 
4  See, e.g.,  World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Air 
Pollution, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 43-49 (2016), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergy
OutlookSpecialReport2016EnergyandAirPollution.pdf. 
5 World Energy Outlook 2009, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 128 (2009), 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2009/WEO2009.pdf; 
World Energy: Energy Access Database, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2009) 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyac
cessdatabase/#d.en.8609. 
6 World Energy Outlook 2014, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 208 (2014), 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2014.pdf 
[hereinafter INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 2014]. 
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that states implement and adopt.7  Likewise, from a climate 
perspective, although the share of the worst GHG-polluting 
generation fuel—coal—grew from 37 to 41% globally from 1990 to 
2012,8 its portion of generaiton is expected to consistently shrink 
going forward:  to 38% in 2020, 33% in 2030, and then 29% in 
2040.9  Similarly, global use of lower GHG-emitting renewable 
sources increased from 1% in 1990 to 5% in 2012,10 and is expected 
to climb to between 12 and 17% in 2040.11 
Still, despite this changing—and expected greening—of the 
electricity sector, climate emissions from power generation remain a 
major threat.  This is because of the industry’s expansive nature, 
driven by both a growing world population and a concomitant rise in 
demand for power, magnified by the increasing electrification of 
global society.  Indeed, while the overall proportion of coal-fired 
generation is expected to decline in future years, it is almost a 
certainty that the total amount of electricity production from coal will 
increase.  As the International Energy Agency projects, coal-fired 
electricity production will grow from 9,204 TWh in 2012 to between 
12,239 and 17,734 TWh in 2040—a 33 to 93% jump.12  This should 
not come as a surprise, given the rapid industrialization of many 
nations.  China, for instance, has built an average of one coal-fired 
power plant every seven to ten days in recent years,13 while India, as 
of 2012, had 100 more coal plants than China in the pipeline.14 
In short, there can be no question that the world’s climate 
trajectory is tethered tightly to the future of the power industry.  Any 
                                                
7  See id. 
8  Id. 
9  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Chapter 5. Electricity, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, Figure 
5.3 (John Conti et al., eds., (2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2016).pdf. 
10  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 2014, supra note 6, at 208. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  As U.S. Shutters Coal Plants, China and Japan are Building Them, 
INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/as-u-s-shutters-coal-plants-
china-and-japan-are-building-them/.  
14  Lisa Friedman, India’s Plans for Coal-Fired Power Plants Soar – 
Study, E&E NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970017.  
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effort to reduce climate change must address electricity directly, as 
scientists and, increasingly, lawmakers across the world recognize. 
In light of electricity’s key role in climate change, this Article 
surveys climate regulation of the electricity industry using case 
studies from four jurisdictions:  Australia, Great Britain, South 
Korea, and the United States.  These jurisdictions offer a useful 
platform for comparison because, while all four are industrialized 
societies playing important roles in the global economy, each has 
chosen a separate path for addressing the climate change effects of 
this critical sector.  Moreover, these states demonstrate varied ways 
of how difficult maintaining consistent regulation of climate 
emissions in the electricity industry has been to date. 
This Article thus provides a window into global climate 
regulation of the electricity sector by showing a variety of legal tools 
curently used to address GHG emissions, from carbon tax and cap-
and-trade mechanisms to renewable energy support regimes.  This 
Article’s contribution is threefold.  First, it offers a primer on both 
the electricity sectors and the climate policies of each of the surveyed 
countries.  Second, by tracing these countries’ policies, it offers an 
introduction into global climate regulation of electricity.  Third, by 
juxtaposing the experiences of these four jurisdictions, the Article 
points to both the areas of success and the challenges of mitigating 
climate change through forcing technological change in the 
electricity industry.  Indeed, these case studies make clear several 
lessons about the influence of climate regulation and its interaction 
with the electricity sector:  (1) jurisdictions are using a wide array of 
policy tools; (2) those policy tools are rapidly evolving; (3) that rapid 
change risks undermining the policies’ effectiveness; (4) policies are 
affecting each other internationally, including through cross-
pollination and by changing electricity markets that are not 
physically interconnected; (5) there are inherent limits on the 
effectiveness of electricity climate laws, including their tension with 
traditional energy regulation; (6) the design and details of these laws 
influences their efficacy; and (7) the laws are changing the shape of 
the global electricity mix, even as other forces are driving change as 
well. 
Six parts comprise the balance of this Article.  Parts II–V are the 
case studies of each of the respective countries surveyed.  Part VI is 
the analysis section drawing on the jurisdiction-specific case studies.  
Part VII summarizes and concludes. 
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II.  AUSTRALIA 
As one of the most vulnerable countries to the negative 
environmental impacts of climate change,15 Australia historically has 
sought to implement innovative solutions to addressing this problem.  
It created the world’s first government agency to support the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and also established “the 
world’s first emissions trading scheme (albeit at a state level).”16  
However, in more recent years, the issue of climate change, and in 
particular, the impact of climate change legislation on the fossil-fuel 
intensive electricity sector, has become highly politicized and a key 
focus of federal elections.  In 2012, the first national Carbon Price 
Mechanism was introduced by the Labor Party.17  This Mechanism 
was then repealed in July 2014 following a change in government 
and the election of the Liberal/National Coalition.18  This meant that 
Australia was the first country in the world to repeal legislated action 
on climate change.19 
In its place, an Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) was 
introduced.  However, the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the Australian economy—the electricity sector—did not 
participate in the initial rounds of the ERF.20  This has led to 
considerable regulatory and policy uncertainty within the electricity 
sector, with state governments increasingly introducing or 
                                                
15  See Ross Garnaut, Chapter 6: Climate Change Impacts on 
Australia, in THE GARNAUT REVIEW 2011: AUSTRALIA IN THE GLOBAL 
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 121 (2011).  
16  Anita Talberg et al., AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY TO 
2015: A CHRONOLOGY (2016), 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/4590624/upload
_binary/4590624.pdf;fileType=application/pdf. 
17 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100 (Austl.). 
18  Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014, s 66 
(Austl.); see generally Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014 
(Austl.). 
19  Talberg et al., supra note 16. 
20 State of the Energy Market 2015, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY 
REGULATOR 1, 8 (2015), 
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/State%20of%20the%20energy%20mark
et%202015%20(A4%20format)%20–
%20last%20updated%204%20February%202016.pdf [hereinafter AER 
2015]. 
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strengthening their climate change and renewable energy legislation 
in an attempt to address climate change in the absence of effective 
Commonwealth Government action.  This has created a highly 
fragmented approach, with layers of duplication and regulatory 
overlap.  
Since the end of 2016, one of the states operating within the 
National Electricity Market, South Australia, has begun to experience 
extensive blackouts, prompting a broad national review of energy 
security within the National Electricity Market (the Finkel Review).21  
Despite repeated calls from the energy sector, key stakeholders, and 
market participants for the consideration of reintroducing a carbon 
price or the creation of a national emissions trading scheme, these 
calls have been ignored by the Commonwealth Government.22  
Without such a scheme in place, it is difficult to see how Australia 
can meet its international commitments to address climate change, 
including from the electricity sector.   
 
A.  ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE 
Under the constitutional settlement between the Commonwealth 
Government and the Australian states at the time of Australia’s 
federation in 1901, the regulation of electricity became largely the 
purview of the Australian states.23  Thus, prior to the electricity 
market reforms of the early to mid-1990s, vertically integrated, state-
government-owned monopolies provided all aspects of electricity 
supply, including generation, transmission, distribution, and retail 
services to customers.  During this period, each state had its own 
agencies responsible for planning, developing, commissioning, and 
                                                
21  See, e.g., Blueprint for Energy Security in the National Electricity 
Market: Independent Review, COAG ENERGY COUNCIL (2016), 
http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publications/d
ocuments/Independent%20Review%20ToR-%207%20October%202016.pdf. 
22 Energy reform is urgent to avert systemic crises, CLEAN ENERGY 
COUNCIL (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/news/2016/december/energy-reform-
needed.html. 
23  See Australian Constitution s 107. 
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operating their own electricity supply system, with only limited 
interconnection between the states.24   
Several reviews of the electricity sector in the early 1990s found 
the existing market structure inefficient, with low productivity and 
high barriers to entry.25  This prompted negotiations between the 
Commonwealth, states, and territories about the future governance of 
the electricity sector and the need to implement market competition.  
The product of these negotiations formed the National Electricity 
Market Legislation Agreement (NEMLA),26 which sought to 
introduce a uniform, single wholesale electricity market across 
eastern and southern Australia, as well as to harmonize the laws and 
regulations governing electricity supply in participating jurisdictions.  
These reforms were designed to facilitate interstate trade, lower 
barriers to competition, increase regulatory certainty, and improve 
productivity within the electricity sector as it transitioned from 
dominance by large, unbundled, state-owned monopolies to 
privatized corporations.  In 1996, the National Electricity Law (NEL) 
was enacted27—in its own right, a major achievement because it was 
only the second time cooperative legislation had been agreed to and 
passed by the jurisdictions.28  Then, in 1998, the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) commenced operation.   
                                                
24  See Commonwealth, Senate Select Committee on Electricity 
Prices: Reducing Energy Bills and Improving Efficiency, Parl Paper No 
ISBN 978-1-74229-712-5 (2012) 2.10 (2012). 
25  See Frederick G. Hilmer, Independent Committee of Inquiry into 
Competition Policy in Australia (1993), 
http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National%20Competition%20Policy%20Review
%20report,%20The%20Hilmer%20Report,%20August%201993.pdf. 
26 Australian Energy Market Agreement, signed 30 June 2004, 
[2004], 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130505164040/http://www.ret.gov.au/Docum
ents/mce/_documents/IGA_FINAL_(30JUNE2004)20040713100323200411
12162849.pdf.  In 2004, the Commonwealth, state, and territory governments 
replaced the NEMLA with the Australian Energy Market Agreement 
(AEMA).  This agreement sets the ongoing agenda for a transition from 
standalone electricity systems to national energy regulation.  The AEMA 
also aims to “promote the long term interests of consumers with regard to the 
price, quality and reliability of electricity and gas services.”  Id. at 6. 
27  National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996, 44 (Austl.) sch. 1. 
(1996). 
28  See National Energy Market: A Case Study in Successful 
Microeconomic Reform, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY MARKET COMMISSION 1, 31 
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1. THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The NEM is a wholesale electricity market through which 
producers generate, sell, transmit, and distribute electricity across six 
jurisdictions in eastern and southern Australia:  Queensland, New 
South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 
Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania.  Despite its name, the NEM 
is not a truly national market, with Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory continuing to operate as separate markets, because 
the long distance between these areas and Australia’s east coast make 
efficient interconnection of the grids infeasible.29  The NEM is made 
up of approximately “330 large generators, five state based 
transmission networks (linked by six cross-border interconnectors) 
and 13 major distribution networks that supply electricity to end use 
customers,”30 with an aggregate installed capacity of 47,641 MW.31  
These industry players are physically linked to over 9 million 
residential and business customers in participating jurisdictions via 
one of the longest continuous alternating current (AC) transmission 
networks in the world.32 
 
                                                                                           
(2013), http://www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/8c426f7d-ea5c-4823-9b86-
510dfd4e82dd/The-National-Electricity-Market-A-case-study-in-mi.aspx. 
29  National Electricity (South Australia) Bill: Second Reading 
Speech, S. Austl. Parl. Deb., L. C. 1481 (1996). 
30  AER 2015, supra note 20, at 24. 
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
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FIGURE 1. GOVERNANCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL 
ENERGY MARKET 
 
 
The institutional and governance structures of the NEM are 
highly complex, as detailed in Figure 1.  The key market institutions 
include (1) the Council of Australian Governments Energy Council,33 
                                                
33  This entity is made up of the “ministers from the Commonwealth, 
each state and territory, and New Zealand, with portfolio responsibility for 
energy and resources.”  COAG Energy Council, Terms of Reference, 
http://www.coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publicat
ions/documents/COAG%20Energy%20Council%20Terms%20of%20Refere
nce%20-%20FINAL.pdf.  The original form of the COAG (Council of 
Australian Governments) Energy Council was the Ministerial Council on 
Energy (MCE), which was established on June 8, 2001.  It was designed to 
be the forum through which the Commonwealth, state, and territory ministers 
having primary responsibility for energy matters could meet to formulate 
national energy policy.  The role of the MCE is described in cl 4 of the 
Australian Energy Markets Agreement (AEMA) (as amended on 9 December 
2013).  Over the past fourteen years, three institutions have held these legally 
enduring roles and powers:  the MCE, from June 8, 2001 through September 
16, 2011; the Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER), from 
September 17, 2011 through December 12, 2013; and the COAG Energy 
Council, from December 13, 2013 to present. 
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which is the entity responsible for national energy policy; (2) the 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), which is the entity 
responsible for market development as well as rulemaking under the 
National Electricity Law;34 (3) the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER), which is the entity responsible for implementing the rules, 
monitoring, and ensuring compliance; (4) the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO), which is the system operator and the 
entity responsible for market development; and (5) the Energy 
Consumers Australia (ECA), which is charged with promoting the 
long-term interests of consumers and advocating on their behalf.35  
These institutions must act in accordance with the National 
Electricity Objective (NEO).  The NEO, in turn, identifies several 
specific objectives for the National Energy Market.  These include 
“promot[ing] efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use 
of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of 
electricity with respect to . . . (a) price, quality, safety, reliability and 
security of supply of electricity; and (b) the reliability, safety and 
security of the national electricity system.”36 
The NEO has long been criticized,37 with questions increasingly 
being asked about whether it is still fit to carry out its purpose.  In 
particular, many observers have expressed concerns that the NEO’s 
narrow focus on the economic interests of consumers limits the 
ability of the Australian energy market institutions to adequately plan 
for the long-term future of the electricity sector, especially in relation 
to growing environmental concerns and sustainability.38 
 
                                                
34  While ostensibly this appears to be a mundane regulatory function, 
the reality of the operations of the AEMC has been that of a chief 
policymaker in relation to electricity in the NEM.   
35  See, e.g., Energy market institutions, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF 
THE ENV’T & ENERGY (2016), 
http://www.environment.gov.au/energy/markets/energy-market-institutions. 
36  National Electricity (South Australia) Act, supra note 27, at sch. 1, 
s 7. 
37  See, e.g., Penelope Crossley, Review of the Institutional 
Governance Arrangements of the National Electricity Market, PUBLIC 
INTEREST ADVOCAY CTR. (2015).   
38  This may be contrasted with the position of the European Union 
and China, which both include a focus on sustainability within their 
equivalent provisions.  
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2. AUSTRALIA’S ENERGY MIX IN A TIME OF MARKET 
TRANSFORMATION 
The need to prepare for a changing energy mix is acute in 
Australia, particularly because the Australian electricity sector is one 
of the most carbon-intensive in the world.  In 2014–15, black and 
brown coal generators accounted for 54% of registered capacity 
within the NEM and supplied 76% of all output.39  Gas-powered 
generators accounted for 20% of registered capacity but only 12% of 
production.40  By contrast, hydroelectric generators accounted for 
16% of registered generation and supplied just 7% of output, while 
wind accounted for 6.6% of registered installations but only 4.9% of 
production.41 
Despite the current carbon intensity of Australian electricity 
generation, the above figures are somewhat misleading because 
small-scale renewables are exempt from registration in the NEM.  
Taking these resources into account reveals that Australia is currently 
undergoing a profound electricity market transformation.  Over 1.5 
million homes currently have residential photovoltaic (PV) solar 
panels, accounting for the highest penetration of residential PV solar 
in the world.42  In fact, in its 2014 State of the Energy Market Report, 
the AER observed that “solar PV generation reduced grid 
consumption by 2.9%” in the 2013–14 financial year alone.43  This 
trend is expected to continue, with AEMO projecting growth rates in 
photovoltaic solar installations of approximately 24% annually over 
the next three years.44  Further, the first large-scale commercial solar 
plant came online in 2015, with many more now in the planning or 
construction phases. 
                                                
39  AER 2015, supra note 20, at 27. 
40 Id. 
41  Id. at 29. 
42  Id. at 30. 
43 State of the Energy Market 2014, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY REGULATOR 1,  
23 (2014), 
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/State%20of%20the%20energy%20mark
et%202014%20-%20Complete%20report%20(A4)_0.pdf [hereinafter AER 
2014]. 
44  National Electricity Forecasting Report for the National Electricity 
Market, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY MARKET OPERATOR I, ii (2014), 
http://www.aemo.com.au/-
/media/Files/PDF/NEFR_final_published_Nov_2014.pdf. 
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In addition to the rapid growth of PV in Australia, there is 
emerging development and commercialization of grid-scale and 
residential energy storage.  While energy storage is already cost-
competitive in some rural and remote areas of Australia,45 UBS 
predicts that it will be cost-competitive for residential electricity 
consumers by 2018.46  Indeed, AGL Energy has suggested that 3 
million customers will be either wholly or partially off-grid by 
2030.47  This is likely to have profound impacts on the NEM—and 
the roles played by the institutions governing it. 
 
B.  DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY 
As the fifth-largest exporter of coal and largest consumer of coal 
per capita in the world, Australia contributes heavily to global carbon 
emissions.48  Despite this, climate change policy in Australia is 
highly politicized and the source of much debate in federal 
elections.49  In turn, this has created significant regulatory uncertainty 
at the Commonwealth level—effectively, a political seesaw over 
what climate policy in Australia will be.   
For example, under the Clean Energy Act of 2011, the Gillard 
Labor Government introduced the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme, which came into force on July 1, 2012.  This scheme—
which set an effective price on carbon of $23 AUD per ton50—was 
designed to shift from a fixed to a floating carbon price under an 
                                                
45  See Jonathan Gifford, Solar Plus Storage Becoming “New 
Normal” in Rural and Remote Australia, RENEWECONOMY (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/solar-plus-storage-becoming-new-
normal-rural-remote-australia-59236.   
46  Giles Parkinson, UBS: Australian Households Could Go Off-Grid 
by 2018, RENEWECONOMY (May 9, 2014), 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/ubs-australian-households-go-grid-2018. 
47  Giles Parkinson, AGL Energy Pick New CEO with Eye to Solar 
and Storage, RENEWECONOMY (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/agl-energy-pick-new-ceo-with-eye-to-
solar-and-storage-35344. 
48 New Report Reveals that Australia Is Among the Worst Emitters in the 
World, CLIMATE COUNCIL (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/new-report-reveals-that-australia-is-
among-the-worst-emitters-in-the-world. 
49  Talberg et al., supra note 16. 
50  Clean Energy Act 2011, supra note 17. 
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Emissions Trading Scheme after three years.  This policy was highly 
successful in reducing carbon emissions, with the Australian Energy 
Regulator reporting that in just two years of operation, the scheme 
helped reduce “output from brown coal fired generators . . . by 
16 per cent (with plant use dropping from 85 per cent to 75 per cent), 
and output from black coal generators . . . by 9 per cent.”51  At the 
same time, the market share of coal-fired generation “fell to an 
historical low of 73.6 per cent of NEM output in 2013-14,” which in 
turn “led to a 10.3 per cent fall in emissions from electricity 
generation over the two years that carbon pricing was in place.”52  
However, following a change of federal government, the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme was repealed in July 2014, and an 
alternative Direct Action policy was introduced by the Abbott 
Liberal/National Government.53  Following the repeal, Australia’s 
carbon emissions rose for the first time in three years, increasing by 
4.3% through June 2015.54   
Frequent changes to climate action are not uncommon in 
Australia.  As the Research Service at the Australian Parliamentary 
Library has described:  
Australia’s commitment to climate action over the 
past three decades could be seen as inconsistent 
and lacking in direction.  At times Australia has 
been an early adopter, establishing the world’s first 
government agency dedicated to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions; signing on to global 
climate treaties the same day they are created; 
establishing the world’s first emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) (albeit at a state level); and 
pioneering an innovative land-based carbon offset 
scheme.  But at other times, and for many reasons, 
Australia has erratically altered course:  disbanding 
the climate change government agency, creating a 
new one then disbanding that; refusing to ratify 
global treaties until the dying minute; and being the 
first nation in the world to undo legislated action 
                                                
51  AER 2015, supra note 20, at 8. 
52  Id. 
53  Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act, supra note 18; 
Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act, supra note 18.  
54 AER 2015, supra note 20, at 8. 
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on climate change, with the repeal of the Carbon 
Price Mechanism.55 
In short, climate action in Australia has hardly been consistent.  That 
is true across all areas of climate change regulatory policy, and in the 
electricity sector in particular. 
This has led to the Australian states and territories creating their 
own climate change initiatives, with significant variability among the 
different jurisdictions.  For example, the ACT has committed to 
achieve 100% renewable energy by 2020.56  South Australia and 
Queensland seek to achieve 50% renewables by 2025.57  And 
Victoria is targeting a 40% goal by 2025.58 
This divergence among subnational governments has created real 
issues within the context of the National Electricity Market, as some 
states have elected to both encourage very high levels of deployment 
of intermittent renewable generation and shut down their older coal-
fired generators.  However, due to the lack of a coordinated national 
approach, some states are at times dependent on their ability to 
import baseload fossil fuel generation on an interstate basis across 
the interconnectors.  This, of course, limits the ability of exporting 
states to change their own energy mixes. 
Despite the zigzagging nature of its climate policy, Australia is a 
signatory of the Paris Agreement.  Still, even then, the bipolarity of 
the nation’s approach to climate mitigation remains:  Australia has 
agreed to reduce its emissions in the form of an Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution of 26 to 28% of 2005 levels by 2030,59 and 
                                                
55  Talberg et al., supra note 16. 
56  Policy Options for Australia’s Electricity Supply Sector — Special 
Review Research Report, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH. 1, 19 
(2016), 
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/prod.climatechangeauthority.gov.a
u/files/files/SR%20Electricity%20research%20report/Electricity%20research
%20report%20-%20for%20publication.pdf [hereinafter Policy Options]. 
57 Id. 
58  Id.  
59 Towards a Climate Policy Toolkit: Special Review on Australia’s 
Climate Goals and Policies, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH. 1, 
41 (2016) [hereinafter Policy Toolkit], 
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/prod.climatechangeauthority.gov.a
u/files/files/Special%20review%20Report%203/Climate%20Change%20Aut
hority%20Special%20Review%20Report%20Three.pdf. 
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it ratified the Paris Agreement on November 9, 2016.60  But meeting 
its emissions reductions target will be difficult in the absence of an 
ETS.  Instead, Australia, for now, will rely on two key mechanisms:  
the Emissions Reductions Fund and the Renewable Energy Target. 
 
1. THE EMISSIONS REDUCTION FUND 
The primary mechanism currently used in Australia to reduce 
emissions is the Emissions Reductions Fund (ERF).  The ERF was 
enacted in 2014 via amendments to the Carbon Credits (Carbon 
Farming Initiative) Act of 2011 and the Carbon Credits (Carbon 
Farming Initiative) Regulations Act of 2011, with a recent addition in 
the form of the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Rule of 
2015.  It is a voluntary scheme that aims to provide incentives for the 
adoption of new practices and technologies that reduce emissions, 
with the intent of helping Australia meet its 2020 emissions reduction 
target—5% below 2000 levels—for the second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol.61 
The ERF has three key elements:  crediting, purchasing, and a 
safeguard mechanism.  Registered participants can earn one 
Australian carbon credit unit (ACCU) for each ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2-e) stored or avoided by an eligible emission 
reduction project.  In order to claim ACCUs, the emission reduction 
project must conform with the requirements of an approved 
emissions reduction method.  Methods have already been established 
for a wide range of activities, including agriculture, transport, oil and 
gas, and the “combustion of coal mine waste gas . . . , improving the 
energy efficiency of commercial buildings and industrial facilities, 
reducing energy demand of small users, flaring landfill gas, [using] 
alternative waste treatment, reforesting and revegetating land and 
managing savanna burning.”62  The Commonwealth Government has 
committed $2.55 billion AUD for purchasing ACCUs,63 with further 
                                                
60  Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, 2016 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.  
61  About the Emissions Reduction Fund, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T 
OF THE ENV’T & ENERGY (2016), http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/emissions-reduction-fund/about. 
62  Policy Toolkit, supra note 59, at 48. 
63  Third Auction Secures High Volume at Low Prices, AUSTRALIAN 
GOV’T  CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR (May 5, 2016) [hereinafter Third Auction 
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funding possibly available under future budgets.  This provides the 
main source of demand for ACCUs. 
Any eligible registered project may participate in the competitive 
reverse auction process used for ACCUs, which is run by the Clean 
Energy Regulator.64  Successful bidders under this process, which is 
designed to ensure that ACCUs are purchased at least cost, are 
awarded a carbon abatement contract of up to ten years’ duration.  
Under these contracts, the government purchases the ACCUs earned 
by the project.65  In order to prevent bidders from overstating their 
projected volume of ACCUs, successful bidders must purchase the 
shortfall amount of ACCUs on the secondary market in order to 
make good their contractual obligation.  There have been three 
auction rounds thus far under the ERF, with the government 
contracting 143 MtCO2-e of emissions reductions from 348 projects, 
at an average price of $12.10 AUD per ton66—at a total cost of $1.7 
billion AUD.67 
The third element of the ERF is the safeguard mechanism, which 
took effect on July 1, 2016.68  The safeguard mechanism ensures that 
emissions reductions purchased through the ERF are not offset by 
significant increases in emissions elsewhere in the economy.  It does 
this by encouraging large businesses (so-called “responsible 
emitters”) not to increase their emissions above a baseline, which 
will ordinarily be “the highest level of reported emissions over the 
five years ending in 2013–14.”69  The baseline may be increased “to 
accommodate economic growth, natural resource availability and 
other circumstances.”70  For new investments coming online after 
2020, “baselines will be set with reference to best practice.”71  In 
                                                                                           
Press Release], 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Pages/News%20and%20updat
es/News-item.aspx?ListId=19b4efbb-6f5d-4637-94c4-
121c1f96fcfe&ItemId=253. 
64  Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 
20G(4) (Austl.). 
65  Id. at s 20C(1). 
66  Third Auction Press Release, supra note 63. 
67  Id. 
68  Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014, supra note 18, at 
sch. 2. 
69  Id. ss 22XG–22XM; Policy Toolkit, supra note 59, at 48. 
70 Policy Toolkit, supra note 59, at 48. 
71  Id. 
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meeting its obligations under the safeguard mechanism, a responsible 
emitter can either (1) ensure that its facility does not exceed its 
baseline, (2) generate its own ACCUs under the ERF to meet the 
shortfall, or (3) purchase ACCUs on the secondary market and then 
surrender them to offset the emissions.  This regulatory measure 
applies to over 370 facilities across a broad range of industries that 
create direct emissions of over 100,000 tCO2-e per year, including 
electricity generation, mining, oil and gas, manufacturing, transport, 
and construction and waste,.72  These facilities collectively account 
for approximately 50% of Australia’s emissions.73   
 
2. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET 
The other policy mechanism used in tandem with the ERF is the 
Australian Renewable Energy Target (RET), which is “projected to 
reduce emissions by about 200 Mt CO2 e (cumulatively) between 
2015 and 2030.”74  The RET was enacted under the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Act of 2000, the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
(Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Act of 2010, the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Large-scale Generation Shortfall 
Charge) Act of 2000, and the 2001 Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Regulations.  It is essentially a “technology pull” scheme requiring 
liable entities to buy renewable energy certificates to meet their RET 
liability.  The RET is divided into two components:  the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) and the Large-scale Renewable 
Energy Target (LRET). 
 
a. The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme 
The SRES creates a financial incentive for residential 
households and small businesses to install eligible small-scale 
                                                
72 Id.; The Safeguard Mechanism, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLEAN ENERGY 
REGULATOR (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/About-the-Emissions-
Reduction-Fund/the-safeguard-mechanism. 
73  See Safeguard Mechanism, supra note 72.  
74  RET Review Modeling: Market Modelling of Various RET Policy 
Options, ACIL ALLEN CONSULTING (2014),  
http://www.acilallen.com.au/cms_files/ACILAllen_RETReport2015.pdf; 
Policy Toolkit, supra note 59, at 45. 
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renewable energy systems such as solar water heaters, heat pumps, 
solar PV systems, small-scale wind systems, or small-scale hydro 
systems.75  Eligible small renewable systems may create Small-scale 
Technology Certificates (STCs) at the time of installation, for the 
amount of electricity the systems are expected to produce or displace 
during the system’s expected lifespan.76  For example, eligible PV 
solar systems are permitted to create, at the time of installation, one 
STC for each megawatt hour (MWh) of eligible renewable electricity 
over fifteen years of the expected system output.77  The government 
has legislated demand for STCs, with RET-liable entities that have an 
obligation under the LRET also having a legal requirement under the 
SRES to buy STCs and surrender them.78  Individual owners of 
renewable energy systems rarely create and sell the STCs themselves.  
Rather, accredited installers typically create the STCs and then sell 
them in larger bundles, offering either a discount on the installation 
price or cash to the owner in return.79 
 
b. The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
Similar to the SRES, the LRET creates a financial incentive for 
the installation and expansion of renewable energy generators, 
including wind farms, concentrated solar thermal projects, and 
hydroelectric power stations.  It does this by legislating demand for 
Large-scale Generation Certificates (LGCs) through annual targets 
that must be met by liable entities, such as electricity retailers.80  In 
short, the LRET is what other jurisdictions may refer to as a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a renewable energy standard 
                                                
75  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter REE Act]. 
76  Id. at ss 20B–23E. 
77  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 
19D(2)(d) (Austl.). 
78 REE Act ss 38AA–38AI, supra note 75. 
79  Claiming Small-scale Technology Certificates, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T 
CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/How-to-participate-in-the-
Renewable-Energy-Target/Financial-incentives/Claiming-small-scale-
technology-certificates. 
80  REE Act, supra note 75, at ss 36–38. 
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(RES), or a renewable obligation (RO).81  Under this scheme, one 
LGC can be created for each MWh of eligible renewable electricity 
produced by an accredited renewable power station.82  LGCs can 
then be sold to liable entities, which surrender them annually to the 
Clean Energy Regulator to demonstrate compliance with the RET 
scheme’s annual targets.83  The revenue earned by the renewable 
energy generator from the trading and sale of their LGCs is in 
addition to that received for the sale of the electricity generated.84 
 
c. The RET Review 
In 2014, Australia held an expert RET Review chaired by Dick 
Warburton, the former Chairman of Caltex Oil in Australia.85  The 
Review was launched after the electricity industry raised concerns in 
the context of declining electricity demand and greater energy 
efficiency, including the charge that the LRET’s volumetric 
requirement of 41,000 GWh of production from large-scale 
renewables by 2020 was too high.  The industry projected that 
approximately 27% of electricity would come from renewables,86 an 
amount significantly higher than the 20% originally intended when 
the RET was designed.  The Review found that the RET “had led to 
the abatement of around 20 million tonnes of carbon emissions and, 
if left in place, would abate a further 20 million tonnes of emissions 
per year from 2015 to 2030—almost 10 per cent of electricity sector 
emissions.”87  However, the Review found that while the cumulative 
impact on household energy bills over the period of the RET was 
likely to be small, the RET was “an expensive emissions abatement 
tool that subsidizes renewable generation at the expense of coal fired 
                                                
81  See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Evaluating RPS Policy Design: 
Metrics, Gaps, Best Practices, and Paths to Innovation, 4 KLRI J. OF L. & 
LEGIS. 3 (2014). 
82  REE Act, supra note 75, at s 18(1). 
83  Id. at ss 20, 44A. 
84  Id. at s 8.  
85  See Dick Wharburton et al., Renewable Energy Target Scheme: 
Report of the Expert Panel, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA i (2014), 
http://apo.org.au/system/files/41058/apo-nid41058-82456.pdf [hereinafter 
WARBURTON REVIEW]. 
86  Id. at 120. 
87  AER 2014, supra note 43, at 30; WARBURTON REVIEW, supra note 
85, at 60. 
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electricity generation.”88  The Review thus recommended that, to 
protect existing generators, the RET be revised to a “real 20 per cent 
target” for large-scale renewable generation (equivalent to 
approximately 33,000 GWh), rather than using the current 41,000 
GWh production target.  The Review suggested this 20% target be 
achieved through a series of yearly targets, set one year in advance 
and corresponding to 50% of growth in electricity demand.89  On 
June 23, 2015, these changes were adopted through legislative 
amendments to the existing RET scheme.90 
 
C.  CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Australia’s electricity sector accounts for almost 35% of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions.91  Yet the Australian Energy 
Council92 recently suggested that to keep global warming to less than 
2 degrees Celsius will likely require Australia to reach “net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades.”93  Such an 
ambitious effort will require significant change within the Australian 
electricity sector, which is currently dominated by highly emissions 
intensive generation.  Indeed, in 2013, “the emissions intensity of 
Australia’s electricity supply was around 85 per cent above the 
OECD average and around 11 per cent above that of China,” with 
electricity emissions “projected to remain flat to 2020.”94   
More problematic, two of the most successful Australian climate 
change policies used to reduce emissions from the electricity 
sector—the price on carbon and the RET—have either been entirely 
repealed or significantly scaled back.  This has had a direct and 
tangible impact on the electricity sector.  While coal-fired generation 
                                                
88  AER 2014, supra note 43, at 30; WARBURTON REVIEW, supra note 
85, at 18. 
89  WARBURTON REVIEW, supra note 85, at iii–iv. 
90  See Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2015 (Cth) 
(Austl.). 
91 Australia’s Climate Policy Options – Special Review Second Draft 
Report, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLIMATE CHANGE AUTHORITY 1, 31 (2015), 
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/prod.climatechangeauthority.gov.a
u/files/SpecialReport2/Options%20paper%20Final.pdf. 
92  The Australian Energy Council is the body representing electricity 
generators and retailers. 
93  Policy Options, supra note 56, at 19. 
94  Id. at 23. 
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output fell by 12% over the two years that carbon pricing was in 
place, the output of brown coal rose by 10% from 2014–15 after 
carbon pricing was abolished.   
By contrast, the ERF appears to have had less of a direct impact 
on electricity generators than other policy initiatives, particularly 
prior to the introduction of the safeguard mechanism.  No electricity 
generation projects participated in the first two rounds of ERF 
auctions.95  Beginning in July 2016, however, the electricity industry 
became subject to a sector-wide baseline as part of the safeguard 
mechanism.  The baseline was set by reference to the sector’s highest 
historical annual emissions over the reference period.96   
The effectiveness of this safeguard mechanism as an efficient 
means of reducing emissions remains to be seen.  What is clear is 
that given the long timeframes and high capital costs associated with 
investments in the electricity sector, stakeholders need more 
regulatory and policy certainty if Australia’s electricity industry is to 
reduce its emissions intensity going forward. 
 
III.  GREAT BRITAIN 
Great Britain (GB)97 is a pioneer in moving its energy sector into 
private hands and creating consistent standards for operating its 
energy markets.  Great Britain’s membership in the European Union 
(EU) has had significant implications for its energy and 
environmental policy, influencing its adoption of targets for both 
                                                
95  AER 2015, supra note 20, at 8.  The vast majority of projects in 
these rounds were “sequestration projects that trap carbon through measures 
such as planting trees and storing carbon in soil; landfill and waste related 
projects; and bushfire prevention through savannah burning.” 
96  Id.   
97 While the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
have collective climate change goals, energy regulation and policy treats 
Northern Ireland (NI) as largely separate, with its own electricity regulator 
and close links to electricity provision in the Republic of Ireland.  Great 
Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) is commonly treated as a single unit, 
though there are significant examples of devolved powers being applied to 
climate change targets and renewable and energy efficiency generation and 
industrial policy in these separate jurisdictions.  Thus, this Part discusses the 
climate policy of Great Britain’s electricity sector, although policy directives 
established at both the EU and UK level are relevant. 
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reducing climate change emissions and increasing renewable energy 
production.  The likely withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) 
from the EU creates significant uncertainty regarding ongoing 
commitments in both of these areas.  A number of UK politicians 
have already raised the possibility of a clearing of environmental and 
other regulations subsequent to withdrawal.  The future of climate 
regulation in Great Britain, then, is murky indeed. 
 
A.  ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE 
Globally, Great Britain was one of the first jurisdictions to 
liberalize its electricity sector.  The 1989 Electricity Act divided the 
publicly held utilities and passed most of them into private hands.98  
Generation was sold to two private companies specializing in fossil 
fuel generation and to one nuclear company, which retained its 
government subsidy.  State-owned regional distribution and supply 
became privately held, the former as regulated monopolies and the 
latter competing for consumers.  Three transmission companies 
emerged from the privatization.  Two smaller grids in Scotland are 
now owned by Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks and by SP 
Energy Networks.  The transmission network in England and Wales 
is owned by National Grid plc, which also acts as the GB-wide 
System Operator, with responsibility for all aspects of balancing the 
grid.  The privatization also created the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (OFFER), which in 2000 merged with the gas regulator to 
create an overarching energy regulator, the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Management (Ofgem). 
The primary purpose of this restructuring was to minimize 
electricity costs by ensuring competition and applying rigorous price 
controls to network regulation.  Over time, however, Ofgem’s 
priorities have evolved, reflecting rising social concerns over 
equitable and environmental issues such as fuel poverty and climate 
change.  Most recently, security of supply concerns related to the 
UK’s falling capacity margin also have become particularly 
politically salient and are now reflected in Ofgem’s priorities. 
Since privatization, the initial three generation companies have 
been joined by many others.  Over 90% of power consumption is 
supplied by the “Big Six” companies:  the French state provider 
                                                
98  Electricity Act 1989, c. 29 (UK).   
 131 
EDF, RWE and Eon (both German), Scottish Power (Spanish-
owned), and British Gas and SSE, both of which are listed on the 
London Stock Exchange.  Each of these companies has traditional 
thermal as well as renewable generation arms, with EDF also 
importing some power through a 2 GW interconnection with France.  
Further interconnections tie Great Britain to the Netherlands (1 GW), 
Northern Ireland (500 MW), and the Republic of Ireland (500 MW).  
Plans for further interconnections are currently underway.99  The UK 
also continues to have a nuclear fleet, but with one exception, that 
fleet is nearing the end of its life, so its capacity has begun to 
diminish.100  The current government supports the growth of new 
nuclear capacity, in part as a way to address both climate change and 
energy security.  This position can be seen most prominently in the 
government’s support for new reactors in a partnership between EDF 
and a Chinese company, the so-called Hinkley Point C plant, which 
will have a 3.2 GW capacity, or roughly 7% of all UK generation.101  
This project is scheduled for opening in 2026, and the UK 
government plans for further development of up to 16 GW more in 
nuclear capacity with these partners and others.102 
                                                
99 Electricity Interconnectors, OFGEM, 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/electricity-
interconnectors (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).  
100  Cf., e.g., Toshiba Woes Expose Fragility of UK’s Future Electricty 
Supply, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c8cb5fb6-f2ca-11e6-8758-6876151821a6;, 
Engineering the UK Electricity Gap, INSTITUTION FOR MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERS (2016), http://www.imeche.org/docs/default-source/position-
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Capacity Assessment, ofgem (Oct. 5, 2012), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40203/electricity-capacity-
assessment-2012.pdf. 
101 See, e.g., Hinkley Point: UK Approves Nuclear Plant Deal, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37369786; 
Stephen Castle, Hinkley Point Nuclear Plant Will Go Ahead, Britain Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/world/europe/britain-hinkley-
point.html?_r=0. 
102  Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, Planning our Electric Future: 
A White Paper for Secure, Affordable and Low-Carbon Electricity, UK 
GOV’T (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/48129/2176-emr-white-paper.pdf; Grant Harris et al., Cost Estimates for 
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It is important to note that both energy policy and climate change 
policy in Great Britain are strongly influenced by commitments at the 
European level.  The main routes of influence are via collective 
negotiations concerning delivery of targets for emission reductions 
and for renewable energy uptake, and via the adoption of directives 
to formalize agreements that can touch upon both areas.  Thus, EU 
directives (essentially acts of law at the EU level) establish targets, 
but EU Member States decide how to reach their agreed national 
goals via policies selected at their own national levels.  There are, 
however, some limits on the latitude Member States enjoy.  One key 
limit is EU legislation on State Aid.  This legislation restricts how 
national spending can be directed, with the specific goal of 
preventing Member States from directing funds preferentially to 
benefit national competitiveness.103 
Significant EU legislation impacting UK energy policy includes 
the 2001 and 2009 Renewable Energy Directives,104 the 2012 Energy 
Efficiency Directive,105 the 2004 CHP Directive,106 and the 2001 
                                                                                           
Nuclear Power in the UK, 62 ENERGY POL’Y 431, 431–42 (2013); Emily Cox 
et al., Understanding the Intensity of UK Policy Commitments to Nuclear 
Power (University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit, Working Paper 
No. SWPS 2016-16, Sept. 26, 2016). 
103  On EU energy governance generally, see, e.g.,  House of Lords EU 
Comm., 6th Rep. of Session 2015-16: EU Energy Governance (Dec. 18, 
2015),  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/71/71.
pdf; Mehmet B. Karan & Hasan Kazdagli, The Development of Energy 
Markets in Europe, in FINANCIAL ASPECTS IN ENERGY: A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2011), 
http://pierrepinson.com/31761/Literature/karan2011.pdf; 2030 Energy 
Strategy, EUR. COMM., https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-
and-energy-union/2030-energy-strategy (last visited May 18, 2017). 
104  Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140/16), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0028&from=en; Directive 
2001/77/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 
2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy 
Sources in the Internal Electricity Market, 2001 O.J. (L283) 33.  
105  Directive 2012/27/EU, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 
2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
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Large Combustion Plant Directive.107  A new renewable energy 
directive is expected to be agreed to shortly, codifying Member State 
commitments on renewables for the period beyond 2020. 
 
B.  DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY 
As a signatory to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement, the United Kingdom has agreed to substantially reduce 
its climate emissions.  Specifically, the United Kingdom agreed to 
aim for a reduction in emissions of 12.5% against the 1990 baseline 
under the Kyoto Protocol, and eventually achieved a 22% reduction 
in the target period of 2008-12.108  Post-Kyoto, the EU’s current 
20:20:20 commitments seek to reduce emissions by 20%, stimulate 
energy consumption from renewables by 20%, and improve EU-wide 
energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020.  Under the 2009 EU directive 
legislating these goals, the United Kingdom agreed to an emissions 
reduction of 16% by 2020 against 2005 emissions.109  The United 
Kingdom ratified the Paris Agreement in November 2016, and has 
also taken some of the steps required by Member States to implement 
                                                                                           
2006/32/EC, 2012 O.J. (L 315/1), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0027&from=EN. 
106  Directive 2004/8/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
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107  Directive 2001/80/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
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pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, 2001 O.J. (L 309/1), 
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108  Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, UK Progress Towards GHG 
Emissions Reduction Targets, UK GOV’T (2015), 
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[hereinafter UK Progress Towards GHG Emissions Reduction Targets]. 
109   Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC,  2009 O.J. (L 140/16). 
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plans to achieve appropriate emission reductions under the 
Agreement post-2020.110  
Although EU Member States have wide latitude to select their 
own policy instruments to meet these goals, the EU itself has erected 
its own measures to facilitate compliance.  The most notable shared 
instrument for climate change emission reduction is the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).  The EU-ETS is a cap-and-
trade approach to emissions reduction.  It applies to bodies with 
significant energy use, including power stations and factories, across 
all twenty-eight EU Member States, plus Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein.  Thus, it covers sectors accounting for almost 50% of 
CO2 emissions.  Under the scheme, all applicable parties are assigned 
emissions allowances, and excess emissions require purchase of more 
allowances while excess allowances can be sold to other parties.  The 
mechanism has been repeatedly criticized for affording an 
overabundance of allowances, a resulting low carbon price, and the 
effect of undermining incentives for innovation in low carbon 
energy.111 
UK commitments to reduce climate emissions do not hinge 
entirely on international and EU treaties, however.  The UK 
previously set for itself a legally binding national target of reducing 
emissions by 80% by 2050, against its baseline 1990 figures,112 
exercising its right to adopt a more ambitious goal than required by 
its EU commitment.  Progress against these figures is reviewed 
through a five yearly carbon budget.  Currently, in the second budget 
                                                
110  UK Climate Action Following the Paris Agreement, COMM. ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2016), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/UK-climate-action-following-the-Paris-Agreement-
Committee-on-Climate-Change-October-2016.pdf; Dep’t for Bus. Energy & 
Indus. Strategy, UK ratifies the Paris Agreement, UK GOV’T (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ratifies-the-paris-
agreement.  There has been some suggestion renegotiation in this area may 
not occur once the UK leaves the EU.  
111  See, e.g., Timothy Laing et al., The Effects and Side-Effects of the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 WILEY INTEDISC. REVS.: CLIMATE CHANGE 
509, 509–19 (2014).  
112  Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27 (Eng.).  
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period, the UK must reduce emissions by 50% by 2025 and 57% by 
2030.113 
To achieve both its EU and domestic targets, the United 
Kingdom has developed and implemented a suite of policy devices.  
These include laws on renewables, energy efficiency, carbon pricing, 
and emissions performance. 
 
1. RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 
The government introduced its first policy to incentivize 
large-scale renewable energy sources for electricity (RES-E) in 1990:  
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), an auction mechanism for 
contracts on a per MWh basis.114  Specifically, the NFFO offered 
contracts to RES-E technologies on a competitive basis within 
technology categories.115  A primary objective of the NFFO was to 
subsidize the nuclear sector, which had fallen on economic hard 
times following the 1990 privatization, with renewables acting as 
something of a fig leaf for this provision.116  Using this program, the 
government collected roughly £1 billion per year from 1990 to 1998 
using a tax applied to consumers via supply companies, with nuclear 
claiming 99% of this initially, although that proportion fell to 90% in 
1998.  RES-E accounted for the remainder until an EU ruling that 
forced the government to cease nuclear support and cut the NFFO to 
around £100 million a year, solely for RES-E.117 
                                                
113  Carbon budgets: how we monitor emissions targets, COMM. ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.theccc.org.uk/tackling-climate-
change/reducing-carbon-emissions/carbon-budgets-and-targets/ (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2016).  All figures are against a 1990 baseline.   
114  See, e.g., Geoff Kelly, Renewable Energy Strategies in England, 
Australia, and New Zealand, 38 GEOFORUM 326, 328 (2007); David Toke & 
Volkmar Lauber, Anglo-Saxon and German Approaches to Neoliberalism 
and Environmental Policy: The Case of Financing Renewable Energy, 38 
GEOFORUM 677, 681 (2007). 
115  Catherine Mitchell & Peter Connor, Renewable Energy Policy in 
the UK 1990-2003, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1935, 1935–47 (2004). 
116  Catherine Mitchell, The England and Wales Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation: History and Lessons, 25 ANN. REV.OF ENERGY & THE ENV’T 285, 
285–312 (2000); see also Davies, supra note 81, at 16-23. 
117  Mitchell & Connor, supra note 5, at 1935–47. 
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In 2002, the United Kingdom replaced the NFFO with the 
Renewables Obligation (RO), an RPS-style mechanism using 
tradable green certificates (TGCs).  The RO was initially technology 
neutral and engendered upticks in RES-E capacity, particularly wind 
energy and biomass, which were the cheapest options available.118  In 
2009, however, the government amended the RO to encourage a 
broader range of technologies, most notably offshore wind, after a 
review suggested that this technology was essential to achieving the 
EU-mandated RE targets.119  Specifically, the 2009 amendments 
adopted a new “banding” structure for the RO, removing the initial 
technology-blind approach and instead setting technology-specific 
targets within the umbrella RO renewable energy goal.120  
The RO aimed primarily at deploying larger scale RES-E, 
with an attempt to apply it to smaller applications leading to poor 
administrative efficiency.121  Thus, in 2010, the government added a 
feed-in tariff (FIT), which sought to support smaller scale 
installations of up to 5 MW.  The FIT was immediately effective.  It 
                                                
118  Id.  
119  Geoffrey Wood & Stephen Dow, What Lessons Have Been 
Learned in Reforming the Renewables Obligation? An Analysis of Internal 
and External Failures in UK Renewable Energy Policy, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 
2228, 2230-34 (2011). 
120 Bridget Woodman & Catherine Mitchell, Learning From 
Experience? The Development of the Renewables Obligation in England and 
Wales 2002-2010, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3914, 3914–21 (2011); Dep’t of Energy 
& Climate Change, The UK Renewable Energy Strategy, UK GOV’T (2009), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/228866/7686.pdf. 
121 Renewables Obligation: Annual Report 2007–2008, OFGEM (2009), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/58192/annual-report-2007-
08version-4-pdf.  For more on different types of renewable energy support 
mechanisms, including their relationship to climate policy, see generally, 
e.g., William Dean, Interactions Among Market Mechanisms for Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 17, 20–22 
(2016); Shahrouz Abolhosseini & Almas Heshmati, The Main Support 
Mechanisms to Finance Renewable Energy Development, 40 RENEWABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS 876, 801–881, 884 (2014); Lincoln L. Davies, 
Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio 
Standards and Feed-In Tariffs, KLRI J. OF L. & LEG. 39 (2011), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2007935 [hereinafter Incentivizing Renewable 
Energy Deployment]; Lori A. Bird et al., Implications of Carbon Cap-and-
Trade for U.S. Voluntary Renewable Energy Markets, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 
2063 (2008). 
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led to rapid growth in PV particularly, aided by a global downturn in 
PV prices that coincided with the FIT’s introduction.  The result was 
an increase in PV capacity from 10 MW in 2010 to 11.4 GW in 
December 2016.122  However, while the rapidly falling global price 
of PV panels aided the FIT’s success, it also provided a tough 
political test for this mechanism, since the compensation levels set by 
the law quickly fell out of line with real world price drops, which in 
turn led to excessive payments and uncapped expansion of total 
public costs.123  Indeed, controversy soon erupted over reductions in 
the tariff as the government tried to bring down the level of support 
while seeking to balance continued renewables growth and cost 
effectiveness.  Nonetheless, growth in RES-E deployment under the 
FIT continued, even with various rounds of cuts to the tariff rate, 
although further substantial cuts in January 2016 appear to have 
flattened growth through that year.124 
Currently, the RO is being phased out and replaced with a 
new mechanism, Contracts for Difference (CfD), to comply with 
E.U. legislation requiring minimization of costs for supporting RES-
E by all EU Member States by 2017.125  The CfD applies a 
competitive auction for contracts for new RES-E generation.  
Winning bids receive the difference between a reference price 
(representing the market price based on the day-ahead market) and 
the strike price (which is set by the highest winning bid in each 
technology category).  This policy device comes with its own risks.  
High market prices mean it is possible contracted generators might 
have to pay funds back to the contracting party.  There thus remains 
an onus on the contracting generator to maximize income from 
                                                
122 Dep’t for Bus., Energy & Indus. Strategy, Solar Photovoltaics 
Deployment, UK GOV’T (May 29, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/solar-photovoltaics-
deployment#history [hereinafter Solar Photovoltaics Deployment] (updated 
Mar. 30, 2017).  
123  Saed Alizamir et al., Efficient Feed-In-Tariff Policies for 
Renewable Energy Technologies, 64 OPERATIONS RES. 52, 52–66 (2016).  
124  Solar Photovoltaics Deployment, supra note 122.  
125  Pablo del Río & Pedro Linares, Back to the Future? Rethinking 
Auctions for Renewable Electricity Support, 35 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY REVS. 42, 42–56; Pablo del Río et al., Identification of Alternative 
Policy Options to Auctions for RES-E Support, AURES (2016), 
http://auresproject.eu/sites/aures.eu/files/media/documents/aures_d6_1_final.
pdf. 
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electricity sales, since it is possible to earn below the amount of the 
reference price.  Further, as with the NFFO, the CfD ties 
subsidization of new nuclear capacity and RES-E support together.  It 
is possible this may cause problems for RES-E in the future, as the 
total fund is now capped through the Levy Control Framework 
(LCF).126 
 
 
                                                
126  See Matthew Lockwood, The UK’s Levy Control Framework for 
Renewable Electricity Support: Effects and Significance, 97 ENERGY POL’Y, 
193, 193–201 (2016).  The LCF is a budget framework put in place by the 
UK Government to limit total allowable public spending on renewable 
energy and some other energy sources.  Until 2010, there was no limit on 
financial support, although mechanisms such as the RO had built in limits on 
spending.  The coalition government elected in 2010 introduced an upper 
limit as part of the UK’s first feed-in tariff for RES-E and the first support 
mechanism for renewable energy sources of heat.  Both of these could 
theoretically have undefined upper costs, so there was some justification for 
this.  The limit was formalized as the LCF shortly thereafter.  
The LCF limits the total spending across various financial support 
instruments, including the FIT, RO, and the CfD.  A key drawback of the 
LCF, however, is it creates considerable uncertainty for renewable energy 
planning.  This is because the LCF only includes the top-up element of the 
CfD strike price.  High future electricity prices mean little requirement for 
top-up from the reference (or market) price to the strike price, but low future 
electricity prices mean a much larger top-up (and thus, a much greater draw 
down from the LCF).  This draw down clearly has substantial implications 
for forward planning regarding investment in renewables, since the UK 
Government has already shown its willingness to skip auctions rounds under 
the CfD.   
Further, the CfD also includes the expected subsidy spending on new 
nuclear power stations.  Since there is considerable uncertainty concerning 
when new nuclear capacity will come online, this creates problems with 
predicting drawdown from the LCF.  To address this, a strike price of £92.50 
(2012 prices) was agreed to for all power from the UK’s first new proposed 
plant, Hinkley Point C, rising with inflation and available for the first thirty-
five years of production.  A second nuclear facility at Sizewell would 
engender a price of £89.50 (2012 prices) for production across both plants.  
This has led to at least one commentator to suggest that the LCF is poorly 
designed and already in need of reform, while acknowledging the political 
difficulties of supporting environmental goals in an era of squeezed incomes.  
Public subsidy for carbon capture and storage (CCS) was originally tied into 
the LCF mechanism.  However, this was withdrawn in 2015. 
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2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
The UK also has committed to improving energy efficiency as 
part of its obligation under EU climate change policy.  Accordingly, 
the government has introduced a number of policy instruments on 
energy efficiency, including the Climate Change Levy (CCL).  The 
CCL is a simple tax, introduced in 2001 and applied to all electricity, 
coal, and gas delivered to commercial and industrial consumers.  The 
CCL was initially set and frozen at 0.43p/kWh, but since has been 
increased in line with inflation from 2007.127  Thus, by increasing the 
total price of electricity, the CCL sought to decrease power 
production from carbon-emitting sources and, in turn, drive down 
GHG emissions.  Renewables initially were exempted from the tax, 
providing them with a slight competitive advantage.128  However, 
beginning in 2015, electricity production from renewables was made 
subject to the tax.129  Electricity from nuclear power has been subject 
to the tax since its introduction.130 
 
3. CARBON PRICING 
The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) that introduced the CfD 
also implemented other mechanisms aimed at mitigating the climate 
change impacts of Great Britain’s electricity market.  Most 
prominently, the carbon floor price (CFP) was introduced with the 
intent of providing stability for carbon prices that the volatile EU-
ETS failed to afford.  Specifically, the CFP set a minimum carbon 
price in the UK, with the idea that this would incentivize low carbon 
technologies.  As Figure 2 details, the initial UK carbon floor price, 
established in 2012, exceeded many projections of the EU-ETS price 
going forward.  Despite this excess, in 2014, the government 
                                                
127  DEPT. FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, Environmental 
Taxes, Reliefs and Schemes for Businesses, UK GOV’T 
https://www.gov.uk/green-taxes-and-reliefs/climate-change-levy (last 
updated Mar. 27, 2017).  Nuclear was taxed despite an absence of carbon 
emissions, but renewable electricity was exempt until 2015.  Prior to this 
date, the effect was to slightly change the economics of renewable adoption. 
128  HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS, Excise Notice CCL1/4: 
Electricity from Renewable Sources,  UK GOV’T 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/excise-notice-ccl14-electricity-
from-renewable-sources (last updated Apr. 20, 2016).   
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
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announced that it would freeze the CFP at £18/tCO2 from 2016 to 
2019 in order to avoid undermining national competitiveness.131  This 
change reflects the shift in the UK from a coalition government to a 
Conservative government following the 2015 elections. 
 
FIGURE 2. INITIAL PROJECTION OF CFP VERSUS EU-ETS 
PRICES 
 
 
4. EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE 
The other relevant Electricity Market Reform mechanism is the 
Emissions Performance Standard (EPS).  The EPS will place an 
upper limit of 450 grams of CO2/kWh132 on emissions from new 
power stations, unless the facilities are CCS-enabled.  This is because 
the UK presently considers CCS a useful method for maintaining its 
fossil-fuel-thermal-generation fleet while continuing to decarbonize 
production.  Initially, in 2007, the government offered a £1 billion 
subsidy to bring a CCS-enabled power station online by 2014.133  
However, because of concerns over cost escalation, no contract was 
                                                
131  Carbon Price Floor: Reform and Other Technical Adjustments, 
HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS (2014),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/293849/TIIN_6002_7047_carbon_price_floor_and_other_technical_amend
ments.pdf. 
132  Energy Act 2013, c.32 (UK). 
133  See ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, FUTURE OF 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE IN THE UK, 2015-16, HC 692, at 6 (UK). 
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signed.134  A later attempt in 2012 to offer a capital subsidy of £1 
billion to two preferred bidders, with additional support from the CfD 
mechanism, likewise failed.  In late 2015, the government withdrew 
unexpectedly from the arrangement, citing a lack of funding.135  
Now, no further progress is expected.  Given the EPS, this suggests 
that no new coal-power stations will be built in the United Kingdom 
in the short- or medium-term. 
 
C.  CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Although the UK has used a number of policy devices over time 
to regulate the climate impact of the electricity sector, there are a 
number of important commonalties that can be drawn from them.  
This is perhaps most apparent in the government’s successive 
adoptions of the NFFO, RO, and CfD as the main instruments for 
promoting large-scale renewable electricity installations.   
First, the motivation for adopting both the RO and the CfD 
reflects the government’s goal of minimizing interference with the 
wider electricity market.  Subsidies through the RO had to be won 
competitively, while generators also competed in the electricity 
market.  Similarly, the CfD requires RES-E generators to maximize 
market value.  By contrast, as with other FIT schemes across Europe, 
the British FIT mechanism directly interferes with the cost 
prioritization of energy sources in the market, since the scheme 
compels supply companies to pay for all power from eligible FIT 
recipients.  Precisely because of this, the government resisted a FIT 
to support large-scale RES-E in favor of the RO, and only relented 
when the RO proved too expensive administratively for promoting 
smaller scale installations.136 
Second, the selection of these mechanisms to support RES-E 
reflects a deep political tension in Britain between ensuring low-cost 
energy and mitigating climate change.  Just as there is clear evidence 
that the RO’s methodology of creating a market for certificates was 
favored for minimizing market interference, it is likewise plain that 
this preference for market function reveals a political desire to keep 
                                                
134  See id. 
135  See id. at 7. 
136  See Renewables Obligation: Annual Report 2007–2008, supra note 
121, at 2. 
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costs down.  The same desire can be seen in the selection of the CfD 
and the explicit rejection of a FIT as an alternative.  It also has been 
argued that the top-up element of the strike price within the CfD will 
mean that RES-E (and contracted nuclear) generators will be 
incentivized to continue generating, even when the market price 
becomes negative.  This has not yet happened in Britain, but 
increasing volumes of intermittent generation may make it a 
possibility in the future, where high production intersects with low 
demand.  The top-up element of the CfD actively incentivizes 
generators to produce more power when less supply might be 
preferable.  Addressing this concern, the government has now ruled 
that CfD contracts do not pay out where prices fall below zero, and 
that no strike prices will be paid in periods where negative pricing 
persists for over six hours.137  Nonetheless, where the price remains 
low but above zero, there remains the issue that RES-E generators 
with CfD contracts will be incentivized to keep generating until the 
market price hits zero, as they will continue to receive the full strike 
price for each unit generated. 
Third, the actual operation of these devices shows how difficult 
matching policy design to desired performance can be.  The RO was 
selected on the basis that its competitive elements would provide the 
greatest downward pressure on costs, thus minimizing taxpayer 
burden.138   In retrospect, however, evidence comparing performance 
of quota regimes like the RO and tariff mechanisms in Europe 
suggests this choice did not achieve the optimal economic efficiency 
that was one of the key justifications for its adoption.139  This was, in 
part, why a FIT became necessary, in addition to the desire to 
promote smaller scale installations.  The government has since 
welcomed the auction format of the CfD to encourage RES-E 
generators to engage with the market to maximize income, thus 
making effective management of their companies even more 
important.  As noted above, however, operational problems may arise 
                                                
137 See Negative Pricing in the GB Wholesale Electricity Market, 
BARINGA 1, 5 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/441809/Baringa_DECC_CfD_Negative_Pricing_Report.pdf. 
138  See Catherine Mitchell et al., Effectiveness Through Risk 
Reduction: A Comparison of the Renewable Obligation in England and 
Wales and the Feed-in System in Germany, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 297, 299 
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as this approach progresses, though it is too early to draw 
conclusions.  
FIGURE 3. U.K. ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL INPUT, 
1980-2014140 
 
Despite these lessons, the UK met its Kyoto Protocol targets 
each year from 2008-2012.141  This was a result of the shift to gas 
generation, mild weather, and an increase in renewable energy 
generation.  Specifically, the UK achieved an overall reduction of 
34.9% in GHG emissions from 1990 to 2014.142 
It should be emphasized that the majority of this displacement 
was driven by economic rather than environmental motivations, even 
as national policies seeking to limit emissions were instituted.  The 
UK benefitted in meeting its emissions reduction targets from a 
phenomenon known as the “dash for gas.”143  That is, the 1990 
                                                
140 Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, UK Energy in Brief 2015, NAT’L 
STAT. 1, 26 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/516837/UK_Energy_in_Brief_2015.pdf.  
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note 108.  
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liberalization of the electricity market created the opportunity for 
new supply companies to diversify and for new sector entrants to 
generate and sell power.144  The most cost-effective way to generate 
power at the time was through construction of combined-cycle gas 
plants, which benefitted from smaller scale and modularity, resulting 
in lower bulk-capital costs and comparatively low gas prices.145  
Further, since the 2008 global economic downturn, the UK has 
reduced electricity consumption and enjoyed the attendant emission-
reduction benefits.146  Figure 3 details both these effects. 
 
IV.  SOUTH KOREA 
The Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea 
(hereinafter Korea) has achieved economic growth through its heavy 
dependence on energy-intensive and export-oriented industries.  As a 
result, this nation quickly has become one of the world’s largest 
energy consumers and a major greenhouse gas emitter, ranking 
seventh in the world for both categories in 2013.  To address these 
trends, beginning in 2008 Korea  has initiated a series of active 
policies and measures to combat climate emissions, including Asia’s 
first nationwide cap-and-trade system.  Yet despite these efforts, the 
Korean electricity sector’s overall dependency on fossil fuels really 
has not changed.  Even under the much-publicized “Green Growth” 
initiative, the government permitted dozens of new coal-fired power 
plants to meet its projected energy demand.  Going forward, then, 
finding a way for the Korean government to bridge the discrepancy 
between its progressive climate policies and its more traditional 
electricity policies remains a key challenge. 
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2016, supra note 143. 
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A.  ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE 
Korea has achieved dramatic economic growth over the past few 
decades, which in turn has led to an ever-increasing demand for 
energy.  In 2015, Korea was the ninth largest consumer of primary 
energy in the world147 and the eigth largest consumer of electricity 
globally.148  On both counts, this ranks Korea as the eighth-largest 
consumer of energy in the world.149  Despite its high energy 
consumption, Korea’s domestic energy reserve is limited.  Korea 
imports more than 95% of its fuel from foreign countries, making it 
one of the top energy importers globally.150  Indeed, in 2014, Korea 
was the second largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the 
world, the fourth largest importer of coal, and the fifth largest net 
importer of total petroleum and other liquids.151 
Fossil fuel-fired power plants make up a significant portion of 
the country’s installed generation capacity.  Although natural gas-
fired plants account for the largest proportion of the nation’s 
generation fleet, baseload generation is provided mainly from coal 
and nuclear power, while natural gas meets peak demand.152  Overall, 
natural gas accounts for 28.7% of installed capacity, while coal 
makes up 28.2% and nuclear 22.2%.153  By contrast, the current 
generation mix of Korean electricity production is 39.1% coal, 30% 
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nuclear, 21.4% natural gas, and 1.5% oil.154  Hydropower and 
renewable energy account for only 4.1% of electricity production.155 
The state-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) 
controls almost all aspects of electricity generation, transmission, 
distribution, and retail sales in Korea.  In 2001, KEPCO’s generation 
assets were divided into six separate subsidiary power generation 
companies.  Although this initial restructuring included plans to 
subsequently divest KEPCO of these subsidiaries, the reform stalled 
in 2004, and KEPCO still owns each of them.156  Besides KEPCO, a 
few independent power producers (IPPs) participate in the Korean 
electricity market.  KEPCO and its subsidiaries produce about 83% 
of all generation, and IPPs produce the remaining 17%.157 The Korea 
Electric Power Exchange (KPX), also established in 2001 as part of 
the electricity sector reform, coordinates the wholesale electric power 
market and determines prices sold between generators and the 
KEPCO grid.  Generation companies compete to sell power into an 
hourly auction pool operated by the KPX, with KEPCO acting as a 
single buyer.  The auction pool is a “cost-based pool,” meaning that 
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the generation companies are required to bid at their variable cost of 
operations.158  However, end-use electricity prices in Korea are 
heavily regulated by the government,159 are not necessarily tied to the 
actual cost of service, and remain far below the levels of other 
economically developed countries.160  That is, the electricity tariff 
pricing system, designed to protect agricultural and industrial 
consumers, historically has not reflected the true costs of generation 
and distribution, and has not provided incentives to conserve 
electricity.161  While the Korean consumer price index increased by 
254% from 1982 to 2011, electricity prices increased by only 30% in 
the same period.162  
Within the government, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy (MOTIE) leads energy policy development and 
implementation.  The Basic Energy Act had governed all aspects of 
the country’s energy policy until the new Framework Act on Low 
Carbon and Green Growth (Framework Act) was enacted in 2010.163  
                                                
158  Pittman, supra note 156, at 156.  
159  See id. at 147.  MOTIE must approve all changes in end-use 
electricity prices.  Even the wholesale competition process remains tightly 
regulated, including separate power auctions and wholesale price ceilings for 
baseload (nuclear and coal) and mid-level and peak (natural gas and oil) 
electricity, as well as plant-specific capacity payments.  
160  Sangho Ji & Ijung Jang, Hangukgwa OECD Jooyogookgagan 
Jeongiyogeum Soojoon Bikyoboonsok [Comparative Analysis of Electricity 
Price among Korea and major OECD member countries, CEO Report], 
KEPCO ECON. & MGMT. RESEARCH INST. 1, 5-6 (July 17, 2013).   
161  See Pittman, supra note 156, at 155.  Prices paid by residential, 
commercial, and educational customers have traditionally been set by 
government regulation at levels at or above their costs of service, while 
prices paid by industrial and agricultural customers have been set below cost.  
162  Energy Policies of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 
Review, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 1, 99 (2012), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Korea2012_fre
e.pdf. 
163  The Framework Act was enacted in January 13, 2010.  Article 8 of 
the Framework Act (Relationship with other Acts) indicates that it takes 
priority over all other laws regarding low carbon and/or green growth.  
Accordingly, the Basic Energy Law was amended on the same date.  The 
Framework Act was most recently amended on April 18, 2017.  See 
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, Act No. 11965, July 30, 
2013 (S. Kor.), translated in National Korean Law Information Center, 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=142380&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000 [hereinafter Framework Act].  
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That law both addressed energy and established Korea’s climate 
change agenda.  Korea’s energy policy includes forecasting a long-
term energy mix and announcing that in the form of the Basic Energy 
Plan, which is mandated by the Framework Act.164  
The second Basic Energy Plan, adopted in 2014, revised down 
the share of nuclear capacity in the previous plan and increased the 
share of fossil fuel-fired generation.  This was due to the combination 
of a nuclear safety scandal in Korea and the Fukushima disaster in 
Japan.165 
As an electricity policy, the Electricity Utility Act requires 
MOTIE to prepare and publish a Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity 
Supply and Demand (BPE) every two years.  The BPE is a lower-
level plan within the Basic Energy Plan.  It details the policy 
direction for the electricity sector, including supply and demand 
forecasts, a capacity plan, and infrastructure needs.  The most recent 
BPE, announced in July 2015, forecasts annual demand growth at 
2.2%.166  According to that plan, a total of forty-seven powerplants 
are either under construction or are planned for construction, to meet 
Korea’s growing electricity demand by 2029.  These include thirteen 
nuclear reactors, twenty coal plants, and fourteen gas plants, together 
totaling 46,487 MW of new installations.167  
 
B.  DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY 
Since 1990, Korean greenhouse gas emissions have doubled, 
with total emissions reaching 572 metric tons in 2013, making Korea 
the world’s seventh largest greenhouse gas emitter—and the fastest 
growing emission source among the OECD’s thirty-four 
                                                                                           
The Energy Act was most recently amended on July 1, 2015.  See Energy 
Act, Act No. 12931, Apr. 14, 2010, translated in National Korean Law 
Information Center, 
http://www.korealaw.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=98472&chrClsCd=010203&ur
lMode=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
164  Framework Act, supra note 163, art. 41. 
165  For a detailed analysis of Korea’s climate change and nuclear 
energy policy, see Siwon Park, Korea’s Nuclear Energy Policy in the 
Climate Era – Policy Change after the Fukushima Accident, 37 KOREA 
ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 223–62 (2015). 
166  The 7th BPE, supra note 152. 
167  Id. 
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industrialized countries.168  Likewise, Korea’s cumulative emissions 
for the past fifty years (1971–2013) rank as eleventh most in the 
world.169  
In part to address this, Korea has actively promoted “green 
growth” initiatives, primarily under the administration of former 
President Lee Myung-bak, who took office in 2008.  The Lee 
administration’s green growth agenda sought to make an active 
response to climate change by reducing emissions while also 
ensuring energy security and promoting job creation in the field.170  
In anticipation of the 2009 climate change summit in 
Copenhagen, Korea pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 30% 
relative to the country’s projected business-as-usual level by 2020.  
In December 2009, the National Assembly then passed the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (Framework Act), 
which included various policy measures to mitigate greenhouse 
gases.  Most notably, this included an emissions trading system, 
carbon disclosure, and promotion of renewable energy.171  Based on 
the Framework Act, the government later passed the Enforcement 
Decree of the Framework Act, which established Korea’s 30% GHG 
mitigation target and made that target legally binding.172  The Lee 
administration also decided to replace Korea’s prior feed-in-tariff 
system with a renewable portfolio standard, beginning in 2012.173  
                                                
168 Statistics: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Highlights, INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY 1, 12 (2016), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissions
fromFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf.  
169 Onsilgaseu Gamchugmogpyo [Korean Greenhouse Gas 
Information Center],  
http://www.gir.go.kr/home/index.do?menuId=22#biz_con4 (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017). 
170  For more information on Korea’s green growth initiative, see 
Green Growth, Now and the Future, COMMITTEE ON GREEN GROWTH, 
http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/download/green-eng-bro.pdf 
171  Framework Act, supra note 163.  
172  Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green 
Growth, Presidential Decree No. 24474, Mar. 23, 2013, art. 25(1) (S. Kor.), 
translated in National Korean Law Information Center, 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=136485&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000.  
173  See Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 
116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 937 (2014). 
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The idea was to stimulate domestic investment in the renewable 
energy sector, which the FIT had failed to achieve.174 
Following the Lee administration, in 2013, Park Geun-hye 
assumed the presidency.  Her administration seemed noticeably less 
interested in a climate change agenda, especially compared to her 
predecessor.  Nonetheless, in January 2014, the government 
announced a “Roadmap for Achieving National GHG Reduction 
Target,” which laid out detailed implementation plans to meet the 
nation’s emissions reduction goal.  This Roadmap reconfirmed the 
prior reduction targets for each sector of the economy.  Specifically, 
it projected that Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions will reach 776 
million tons of CO2 equivalent by 2020, and stated that the country 
will aim to reduce those emissions by 30%, or to 543 million tons of 
CO2 equivalent.175  Reduction targets for each of the seven major 
economic sectors were set:  34.4% in transport, 26.9% in building, 
26.7% in power generation, 18.5% in industry, 12.3% in waste, and 
5.2% in agriculture.176 
To prepare for the Paris Agreement in 2015, the Korean 
government quickly updated the greenhouse emissions reduction 
goals.  In that regard, the government announced it would reduce its 
GHG emissions by 37% from its 2030 emission projection.  This 
commitment, however, drew criticism from both within and outside 
of the country as too weak, especially considering Korea’s significant 
contribution to global emissions.177 
                                                
174  See id. 
175  Gookga Onshilgas Gamchukmokpyo Dalsungeul Wihan Roadmap 
[Roadmap to Achieve National Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Target], 
COLLABORATED MINISTRIES 11.  See also Greenhouse Gas Reduction Road 
Map, MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, 
http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/index.do?menuId=212 (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017). 
176  Id. 
177  See Choi Hyeonjung & Lee Soo-hyun, Not Good Enough: South 
Korea’s 2030 Carbon Mitigation Target and the INDC, CTR. FOR GLOB. 
GOVERNANCE 8–16 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://en.asaninst.org/contents/not-good-
enough-south-koreas-2030-carbon-mitigation-target-and-the-indc-2/; see 
also Tracking (I)NDCs, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, (last updated Nov. 8, 
2016), http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html.  
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Today, to achieve these emissions reduction goals, Korea is 
implementing two key systems to alter its electricity sector:  an 
emissions trading scheme and a renewable portfolio standard. 
 
1. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
In May 2012, under former president Lee Myung-bak, the 
government promulgated the Act on the Allocation and Trading of 
Greenhouse Emission Permits, which established a cap-and-trade 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gas emissions.178  
This was the first national emission trading scheme in Asia.  The 
Korean ETS started on January 1, 2015, after two years of delay due 
to opposition from industry.  The ETS covers facilities emitting more 
than 25,000 CO2 equivalent annually, representing 525 of the 
country’s largest emitters, or about 68% of national greenhouse gas 
emissions.179  The government set emissions caps and reduction 
targets for each trading period.  Three initial phases have been 
outlined.  The first phase runs from 2015 to 2017, the second from 
2018 to 2020, and the third from 2021 to 2025.180  In the first phase, 
all carbon allowances were offered for free.  The government will 
offer 97% of allowances for free in the second phase and less than 
90% in the third phase.181  The remainder will be auctioned.182  
Energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) companies will receive 
                                                
178  Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse—Gas Emission 
Permits, Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013 (S. Kor.), translated in National 
Korean Law Information Center, 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=137271&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
179 Korea Emissions Trading Scheme, INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, 
ETS DETAILED INFO. 1, 1 (last updated Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format
=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=47. 
180  Id. at 2. 
181  Id. 
182  Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and Trading of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits, Presidential Decree No. 24429, Mar. 23, 
2013, art. 13 (S. Kor.), translated in National Korean Law Information 
Center, 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=135892&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
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100% of their allowances for free in all phases, a concession made to 
address international competitiveness concerns.183  
Banking and borrowing of credits is allowed under the ETS, 
although borrowing is limited to 10% of all permits.184  Offsets are 
also allowed up to 10% of all emissions.  Overseas offsets will be 
permitted beginning in the third phase.185  The government may also 
adjust or cancel allowances under the certain circumstances, 
including unexpected facility expansion or shutdown.186  Non-
complying facilities may be penalized in an amount equivalent to or 
less than three times the average market prices of allowances, or 
KRW 100,000 per ton.187  
Just a few months before the ETS was implemented, the new 
Park Geun-hye administration loosened the regulation in response to 
the business sector.  Specifically, the government increased 
allowances by 10% for all sectors above the initial allowance plan.  
For the power generation sector, the government set the allowances 
to the level of actual mitigations in 2013 and 2014, further reducing 
the mitigation burden.188 
Initially, the Ministry of Environment was designated as the 
single authority to administer and manage the ETS.  This included all 
key responsibilities—allocation planning, decision of scope of 
covered entities, determination of allowances, management of the 
allowance register, allowance certification, imposition of fines, and 
                                                
183  See Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse—Gas 
Emission Permits, supra note 178, at art. 12.4 (this act creates the 
exemption); see also Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and 
Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits, supra note 182, at art. 14 (this 
decree contains the list of criteria for eligible businesses). 
184   Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and Trading of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits, supra note 182, at art. 36.  
185  Id. at art. 38.  
186  Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-Gas Emission 
Permits, supra note 178, at art. 23.  
187  Id. at art. 33.1. 
188  See Press Release, Ministry of Strategy & Finance, Government to 
Implement Emissions Trading System in 2015, Postpone Implementing Low 
Emission Vehicle Standards Until 2020 (Sept. 2, 2014) (S. Kor.), 
http://english.mosf.go.kr/skin/doc.html?fn=[MOSF%20Press%20Release]%
2030th%20Ministerial%20Meeting%20on%20the%20Economy.pdf&rs=/res
ult/upload/mini/2014/09/. 
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fact-finding research.189  However, in February 2016, the government 
transferred implementation authority to the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance.  The government also designated the Prime Minister’s 
Office as the central authority for all climate change-related policy, 
instead of the Ministry of Environment.  The stated rationale for 
these moves was to establish better coordination and implementation 
of the climate change policy.190  Yet, many critiqued this new 
institutional arrangement as an effort to be more business friendly 
while diminishing the role of the Ministry of Environment.191 
It is too early to discern the ETS’s impact.  In the first year-and-
a-half of operation, trade under ETS has been limited.192  At the end 
of the first year of phase one, total emissions of all facilities covered 
by the system were reported to be 542.6 million tons of CO2 
equivalent, or about 6.1 million tons of CO2 equivalent less than the 
                                                
189  See Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and Trading 
of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits, supra note 182, at art. 6; see also Act 
on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-Gas Emission Permits, supra 
note 178, at art. 7 (listing various multi-ministry consultative bodies that 
have been organized among the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, such as 
the Emission Allowance Allocation Committee, the Allocation Approval 
Committee, and the Allowance Certification Committee). 
190   Press Release, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Enhancement of 
institutional arrangement for effective implementation of Paris Agreement 
(Feb. 25, 2016) (S. Kor.), 
http://www.pmo.go.kr/pmo/news/news01.jsp?mode=view&article_no=8898
0&board_wrapper=%2Fpmo%2Fnews%2Fnews01.jsp&pager.offset=0&sear
ch:search_key:search=article_title&search:search_val:search=%25C6%25C4
%25B8%25AE%25C7%25F9%25C1%25A4&board_no=6. 
191  Park Eli Sejong, Go to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance for 
Greenhouse System, ETODAY (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.etoday.co.kr/news/section/newsview.php?idxno=1294837. 
192  Ministry of Strategy & Finance, Baechulgwon Goereje  Shihang 1-
nyeon, Jindangwa Pyunga [The first year of implementing ETS, assessment 
and evaluation], NAT’L ASSEMBLY CLIMATE CHANGE FORUM 1, 7 (Aug. 24, 
2016).  According to the government data, 1.8 million tons of allowance 
units (KAU) were traded and 2.9 million tons of offset units (KCU) were 
traded, totaling 70.9 billion KRW (about 60 million USD) as of June 2016.  
The allowance price ranges from 15,000 to 20,000 KRW (about 13 to 16 
USD).  
 154 
total allowance cap set by the government.193  This suggests that 
there was an over-allocation in the first phase.  
 
2. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 
Korea’s renewable energy generation is among the lowest in the 
OECD.194  In 2013, Korea’s renewable energy use accounted for only 
1% of total primary energy supply and 1.6% of total electricity 
supply.195  By source, waste and bioenergy account for the majority 
of renewable energy production in Korea (60% and 24.3%, 
respectively), while solar and wind account for only small fractions 
of renewables use (4.7% and 2.1% in 2014).196  A notable feature of 
Korean renewable energy law is that it includes non-renewable 
resources, including gasified coal, gasified heavy residual oil, and 
fuel cells; these are counted as eligible “new energy” resources.197  
Further, Korean law defines waste energy to include non-
renewable—and environmentally controversial—industrial waste.  
Korea’s broad definition of “new and renewable energy” thus 
explains, at least in part, the country’s low reliance on other 
renewables, such as wind and solar.198 
As noted, the government replaced Korea’s feed-in tariff 
mechanism with this renewable portfolio standard in 2012.199  
Korea’s RPS scheme requires the largest public and private power 
                                                
193  Id. at 9. 
194  Energy Policies of IEA Countries, supra note 162, at 10, 96.  
195  NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, at 
740–42.  
196  See id. at 734–35.  In regard to electricity generation, waste 
accounts for 53.3%, biomass 17.3%, solar 9.5%, and wind 4.3%.  
197  Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of 
New and Renewable Energy, Act No. 13087, art. 2, Jan. 28, 2015 (S. Kor.), 
translated in National Korean Law Information Center, 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=167700&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#000. 
198  See NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, at 
734, 740–42 (explaining the discrepancy between domestic and international 
renewable energy data).  For example, in 2013, the domestic statistics show 
that new and renewable energy accounted for 3.52% of all energy supply, 
while international statistics estimated the share as 1%.  
199  Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of 
New and Renewable Energy, supra note 197, at art. 12.5. 
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companies—those with installed capacity greater than 500 MW—to 
steadily increase their use of renewables for electricity generation 
through 2022.  Specifically, the initial RPS set targets at 2% 
electricity from renewables in 2012, elevating to 10% by 2022.200  
However, RPS targets are reviewed and adjusted every three years.  
As of 2017, the obligated generators include eighteen power 
companies, but the RPS’s end target of 10% has been delayed to 
2024.201 
Compliance under the Korean RPS functions in two ways.  First, 
in order for power companies to meet their RPS targets, they can 
either invest in renewable energy installations themselves or 
purchase tradable certificates—RECs—on the market.202  Second, 
non-complying power companies must pay a financial penalty up to a 
50% above the average market price of RECs for that year.203  The 
number of RECs allocated for electricity from renewable sources 
varies depending on the technology used, the location, and the size of 
the installation.204 
Within the general RPS target, the government also set a 
mandatory quota for solar PV specifically for each year.205  After 
reaching 1,971 GWh of solar PV production, however, the 
government concluded that the mandatory quota had sufficiently 
facilitated expansion of PV and thus terminated the quota at the end 
of 2015.206 
                                                
200 See generally Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), KOREA 
ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.energy.or.kr/renew_eng/new/standards.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
201  Id.  
202  Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of 
New and Renewable Energy, supra note 197, at art. 12.5. 
203  Id. at art. 12.6. 
204   Korea Energy Master Plan: Outlook and Policies to 2035, MOTIE 
– MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUS. AND ENERGY 1, 118 (2014), 
http://www.motie.go.kr/common/download.do?fid=bbs&bbs_cd_n=72&bbs_
seq_n=209286&file_seq_n=2.     
205  See Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion 
of New and Renewable Energy, supra note 197, at art. 12.5(2).    
206  Sin-eneoji mich jaesaeng-eneoji gaebalㆍiyongㆍbogeub 
chogjinbeob sihaenglyeong [Enforcement decree of the Act on the Promotion 
of  the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy], 
Presidential Decree No. 27660, Dec. 5, 2016, art. 18.4(3), app. 4 (S. Kor.).  
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During the first four years of RPS implementation, 6,041 MW of 
new eligible generation were installed.  This stands in stark contrast 
to Korea’s experience with its former FIT regime.  The new RPS has 
already yielded six times more installations than what the prior FIT 
regime led to in ten years of operation.207  The compliance rate of 
RPSs has increased from 64.7% in 2012 (4.154 million RECs) to 
90.2% in 2015 (12.486 million RECs).208  A close analysis of 
compliance patterns shows that generators tend to use energy sources 
that are easily accessed and convertible with fossil fuels, such as 
imported wood pallets.  As a result, wood pallet imports to Korea 
have increased at an unprecedented rate,209 and compliance with the 
RPS has been achieved mainly by relying on biomass.  Compliance 
figures for 2014 indicated 32.2% use of biomass, 14.1% use of fuel 
cells, 11.6% use of solar PV, and 7.4% use of wind.210 
 
C.  CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Today, Korea’s electricity sector accounts for about 35% of 
Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions—a sharp increase from 1990, 
when it accounted for only 12% of emissions.  The electricity sector 
thus leads the nation’s overall emissions growth.  This growth mainly 
resulted from decreased reliance on nuclear power and increased use 
of coal plants in Korea, which in 2012 accounted for 77% of GHG 
emissions within the sector compared to 48% in 1990.211  More 
importantly, coal’s growing prominence in Korea’s energy mix is 
only expected to continue under the nation’s long-term energy 
                                                
207  NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, at 697. 
208  Id. 
209  See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2016 Top Markets Report Renewable 
Fuels: Country Case Study, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 1, 2 (2016), 
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Renewable_Fuels_South_Korea.pdf 
(reporting that from 2013 to 2014, imports quadrupled from 485 million kg 
to 1.85 billion kg). 
210   RPS Jedo Hyunhwang mit Hyanghoo Junmang [The Status of RPS 
and its Prospect], KOREA ENERGY AGENCY (Jan. 2016).  
211  Suyi Kim & Sung-Kyun Kim, Decomposition Analysis of the 
Greenhouse Gas Emission in Korea’s Electricity Generation Sector, 7 
CARBON MGMT. 249, 249–60 (2016); see also GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 
& RES. CTR. OF KOR., 2015 NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY REPORT 
OF KOREA 37 (2015). 
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plans.212  The second Basic Energy Plan adopted in 2014, which will 
drive Korea’s energy policy through 2035, revised down the share of 
nuclear capacity from the previous plan (from 41 to 29%) and 
increased the share of fossil fuel energy213—while keeping renewable 
energy production at the same level (11%) as in the previous plan.  
Further, the government forecasted that total energy demand will 
double by 2035, and said that it plans to meet this demand by 
installing twenty additional coal plants by 2029. 
So far, then, Korea’s climate change policies have had very 
limited impact on the nation’s electricity sector.  Although Korea’s 
new emission trading scheme includes the electricity industry, and its 
RPS mandates increased use of renewables for power generation, 
those policies have done little to transform the sector to date.  There 
are several fundamental reasons for this. 
First, end-use electricity prices are heavily regulated by the 
government and remain artificially low compared to other 
economically developed countries.  As a result, electricity 
consumption has skyrocketed over the past few decades, with a 
growth rate much higher than that of the overall energy sector.  This 
demand control failure has pushed the government to increase 
electricity supply and grant licenses to build new power plants.  
Against rising opposition to nuclear energy following the Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster in neighboring Japan, Korea plans to meet this 
energy demand primarily through new fossil-fuel energy plants. 
Second, electricity planning in Korea has not been compatible 
with climate change planning.  Under the Framework Act on Low 
Carbon and Green Growth, green growth plans take top priority, and 
energy and climate change plans are subordinate to these economic 
goals.  Further, energy plans and climate change plans are prepared 
separately by different agencies, through different planning 
processes.  In particular, the Basic Plan for Long Term Electricity 
Supply and Demand (BPE) has been prepared and drafted solely by 
MOTIE, a government agency with a top policy priority of sufficient 
electricity supply and no real focus on the national greenhouse gas 
                                                
212  See The 7th BPE, supra note 152; see also Korea Energy Master 
Plan, supra note 204.  
213  Korea Energy Master Plan, supra note 204, at 9.  
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mitigation target.214  Only in 2013, following a controversy 
pertaining to the sixth BPE, which included plans for a massive 
expansion in coal plants, did the Electricity Utility Act direct MOTIE 
to:  (1) “make effort” to align its plans with the national GHG 
mitigation target; (2) consult with other ministries, including 
Ministry of Environment; and (3) conduct public hearings before 
finalizing a plan.215  
Third, the cost-based operation of the Korean electricity market 
does not give sufficient attention to climate change considerations.  
Under the current merit-order dispatch system, which the Korea 
Power Exchange uses to identify the generation units that will supply 
electricity during each hour and at what price, the generation unit 
with the lowest variable cost is awarded first priority of operation.216  
Thus, less carbon-intensive gas power plants cannot win bids over 
coal plants, and climate emissions are exacerbated.217  As a result, 
electricity from gas plants is currently used only during peak times, 
when it can supplement coal and nuclear baseload generation.  
Therefore, under the current structure of Korea’s electricity 
market and policy, major climate change regulations, including the 
ETS and RPS, are necessarily constrained in their effects.  Until there 
is a fundamental change in Korea’s supply-focused electricity policy, 
including improved coordination between electricity and climate 
change policy planning, Korean dependence on coal will only 
continue.  Potentially, that change is already coming.  A significant 
amendment of the Electricity Utility Act, adopted in March 2017 and 
set to take effect on June 22, 2017, requires consideration of 
                                                
214  See Cheolhung Cho & Eui-chan Jeon, Is Energy Policy Compatible 
with Climate Change Policy?, 13 KOREAN ENERGY ECON. REV. 199–230 
(2014) (showing the projection of GHG emissions according to the sixth 
BPE will exceed the 2020 GHG emissions target of the electricity sector, 
which is a 26.7 reduction from the BAU scenario); see also IJIN KIM & 
SOOCHUL KIM, A Study on National Plans for Greenhouse-gas Reduction, 
KOR. ENV’T INST. 87 (2013–17).  
215  Electric Utility Act, Act No. 12612, art. 25.2, 25.5, 25.7, May 20, 
2014 (S. Kor.), translated in National Korean Law Information Center, 
http://www.korealaw.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=154034&chrClsCd=010203&
urlMode=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
216   See Korea Electric Power Co., Annual Report, supra note 155, at 
30. 
217  Natural gas used in Korea is all liquefied natural gas imported by 
ship, with a price higher than imported coal. 
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environmental impacts and public safety in both the operation and 
planning of the electricity.218  This amendment reflects the growing 
concern over the safety of nuclear plants and the deleterious impacts 
on air quality from coal plants.  The amendment is expected to 
change the current electricity dispatch system to encourage operation 
of natural gas plants while discouraging coal and nuclear power.  
Meanwhile, GHG emissions from the nation’s electricity sector 
continue to increase, although the impact of this new amendment 
remains to be seen. 
 
V.  UNITED STATES 
Although the United States has a strong reputation for—and a 
long history of—environmental protection, the nation often is seen as 
lagging behind in climate change mitigation efforts.  This is due in 
part to the United States’ significant contribution to global climate 
emissions.  The United States ranks second globally in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions,219 consistently comprising about a tenth or 
more of worldwide GHG emissions since 1990.220  These 
contributions, moreover, are high due in part to the way the United 
States regulates electricity.  It is well-documented that U.S. energy 
governance is fractured and fragmented,221 and that this is 
                                                
218  Electric Utility Act, Act No. 12612, amended by Act No. 9680, 
May 21, 2009 (S. Kor.).  In March 21, 2017, Articles 3.2 and 3.3 were newly 
added to Electricity Utility Act. 
219  See, e.g., Duncan Clark, Which Nations are Most Responsible for 
Climate Change?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011, 15:40 BST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/21/countries-
responsible-climate-change; see also Biggest Contributors To Global 
Warming In The World By Country, WORLD ATLAS (last updated Feb. 9, 
2017), http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-contributors-to-global-
warming-in-the-world.html.  
220  See Summary of GHG Emissions for United States of America, 
U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT 1, 1 (2012), 
http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/usa_ghg_profile.p
df; see also Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE?end=2013&star
t=1960&view=chart (last visited Jan. 2017).  
221  See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-
Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, 
Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 
46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The 
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particularly true in the electricity sector, where statutes like the New 
Deal-era Federal Power Act222 continue to draw bright lines between 
what parts of government can shape the sector and how.223  As a 
consequence of this regulatory fragmentation, as well as sharp 
divides politically in the United States over what efforts should be 
taken to combat climate change, U.S. climate policies have been very 
much a piecemeal, start-and-stop proposition.  The electricity sector’s 
response, in turn, also has been less than uniform.  Over roughly the 
last decade, the United States seemed increasingly poised to begin 
mitigating the climate impacts of its electricity sector, both through 
federal efforts like the Clean Power Plan and state efforts such as 
renewable portfolio standards.  Following the recent election of 
Donald J. Trump as president, however, there is now much doubt 
about the future of climate regulation in the United States. 
 
A.  ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE 
The U.S. electricity grid is composed of three primary 
interconnections:  the Western Interconnection, which runs roughly 
from the Pacific Ocean to just east of the Continental Divide; the 
Eastern Interconnection, which runs from its seam with the Western 
Interconnection to the Atlantic Ocean; and the Electricity Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT), which covers much of that state.224  In 
addition, Alaska and Hawaii have independent electricity systems 
separate from those in the continental United States.225  
                                                                                           
Integration of Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 
369 (2011). 
222  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)–828c (2016). 
223  See generally, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and 
Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2013); 
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission 
Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1801 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy 
Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal 
Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011);  Hannah J. Wiseman, Clean Energy Incentives: 
Risk, Capture, and Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 161 (2016). 
224  Electricity Explained: How Electricity Is Delivered To Consumers, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last updated Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/power_grid.cfm. 
225  Id. 
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Historically, vertically-integrated, investor-owned utilities 
dominated electricity service in the United States.  Thus, in 1970, 
investor-owned utilities served over 78% of retail customers.226  As 
part of a larger wave of industrial deregulation and restructuring that 
swept the nation beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
U.S. electricity sector soon began a steady march toward 
liberalization.227  It is difficult to say precisely when this effort 
began, but it arguably was marked by passage of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).228  That Act sought to 
encourage generation diversity by requiring incumbent utilities to 
purchase power from so-called “qualifying facilities,” or “QFs,” such 
as cogeneration and renewable energy producers.  The Energy Policy 
Act of 1992 followed,229 which further opened the electricity 
generation market to competition by allowing non-utility generators 
to supply power without being subject to utility holding company 
regulation.230 
At the same time, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the federal agency charged with regulating portions of the 
electricity sector, did its own work to liberalize U.S. electricity 
markets.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, FERC began allowing 
                                                
226  EDISON ELECTRIC INST., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE ELECTRIC 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 325, TABLE 48 (1993).  
227  See Joe D. Pace & John H. Landon, Introducing Competition into 
the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 9–65 
(1982); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the 
Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 601–02 
(2005); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 463–79 (2005).  For an 
overview of the history of electricity regulation in the United States, see 
Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government 
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829 (1998). 
228  Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 
Stat. 3117, 3119 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 918c, 42 U.S.C. § 6808, 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16. U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C. (2012)). 
229  Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701z–16, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506, scattered 
sections of 16 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
230  Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 
1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 
YALE J. ON REG. 447, 464–65 (1993); see also, Arturo Gándara, United 
States-Mexico Electricity Transfers: Of Alien Electrons and the Migration of 
Undocumented Environmental Burdens, 16 ENERGY L.J. 1, 23 (1995). 
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utilities and other entities to sell wholesale electricity at “market-
based” rates—that is, at prices and terms the parties negotiated.231  
This was a sharp break from FERC’s traditional practice of 
approving individual power purchase agreements one at a time using 
cost-of-service regulation under the Federal Power Act’s “just and 
reasonable” standard.232  Then, in 1996, FERC pushed the industry 
even further toward competition.  The agency adopted its landmark 
Order No. 888, which required transmission owners to sell excess 
capacity on a first-come, first-served basis using standard terms and 
conditions.233  The result was a rush to competition for wholesale 
electricity.  “Order No. 888 amplified the paradigm shift to more 
competitive and restructured wholesale electricity markets.”234 
While FERC was busy encouraging electricity competition at the 
wholesale level, states also joined the fray.  As part of the nation’s 
federalist system of governance, FERC and states share regulatory 
authority over the electricity sector in the United States.  FERC has 
jurisdiction over wholesale power sales, transmission sales, and 
reliability of the bulk power system.235  States have jurisdiction over 
retail electricity sales, distribution, siting of facilities, and the 
structure of their generation fleets.236  Thus, FERC’s efforts in 
promoting competition only went so far.  State action was also 
needed. 
That state action came in the form of a wave of restructuring 
efforts in the 1990s.  As of 2003, twenty-four states and the District 
of Columbia had passed legislation or adopted policies either 
requiring or encouraging incumbent utilities to sell off their 
generation assets, with the aim of further breaking up the hold of 
vertically integrated utilities on the market.237  This had a 
                                                
231  LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY  399–409 
(2014) [hereinafter ENERGY LAW AND POLICY]. 
232  See 16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
233  Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open 
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; 
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).  
234  Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, 
and Regulation: A Look Back, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33, 36 (2010).  
235  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
236  See New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
237  Channele Carner, Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring 
Activity, U. S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 1, 2 (Feb. 2003), 
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meaningful, reinforcing impact on FERC’s policies seeking to 
restructure the wholesale market.  “In 1996 there [were] about 
750,000 Mw of utility-owned electric generating capacity in the U.S. 
of which investor-owned utilities (IOUs) accounted for about 
580,000 Mw.”238  After 1996, however, “about 100,000 Mw of 
generating capacity was divested by IOUs and another 100,000 Mw 
transferred to unregulated utility affiliates to compete in the 
wholesale market.”239  This quickly ushered in more competition.  
Thus, by 2004, roughly 80% of new generating capacity was from 
“independent power companies and unregulated affiliates of 
utilities.”240 
As states adopted these restructuring laws, many also aimed to 
bring electricity competition to the retail level.  For two reasons, 
however, these efforts quickly plateaued.  First, the California energy 
crisis of 2000, marked conspicuously by the fall of Enron after that 
company manipulated prices in western markets, scared off every 
other state that was considering restructuring—and convinced some 
to abandon the process.241  Second, state efforts to roll out retail 
competition were quite uneven and often ineffective.  Roughly 
twenty states moved to retail competition, and while none of these 
reverted to cost-of-service regulation, only four have seen more than 
a quarter of their customers switch retail providers:  Texas (100%), 
Connecticut (44.1%), Ohio (42.2%), and Pennsylvania (31.5%).242 
                                                                                           
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/pdf/restructure.p
df. 
238  Paul L. Joskow, Markets for Power in the United States: An 
Interim Assessment 10 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Stud., Working 
Paper No. 05-20, 2005).  
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION 
AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 248–53 
(1999); see also Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 476 n.109 (2015); see Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & 
William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)regulation 
After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35 (2005). 
242 Abaccus: An Assessment of Restructured Electricity Markets, 
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY FIN. GRP. LLC 1, 20 (2012), 
http://defgllc.com/publication/2012-abaccus-electricity-restructuring-
scorecard/ (under Download heading, select “Defg-abaccus-
2012.pdf2.72mb” hyperlink; log-in required). 
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The result of these decades of changes is that the U.S. electricity 
sector today is a mishmash of different systems of governance, 
regulation, and competition.  Layered on top of the three major 
interconnections is a conglomeration of regional transmission 
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) that, 
depending on their specific circumstances, are the successors to 
historic power pools that utilities had voluntarily formed or are new 
creations made to promote competition in the sector.  These 
organizations, which FERC originally had wanted to force all major 
utilities to join,243 operate the grid in many parts of the country and 
run formal transmission and generation markets.244  Meanwhile, 
beneath this tangle of systems is also significant diversity in how 
electricity is provided to ultimate consumers.  Some states continue 
to run retail competition programs, while most do not.245  Thus, 
roughly 61% of retail electricity continues to be delivered by 
incumbent utilities, just over 13% comes from cooperatives, and 
almost 13% comes from local municipalities, while only the 
remainder is provided by new competitors in the market.246   
Generation also varies heavily.  Coal and natural gas currently 
make up the bulk of U.S. electricity production, each comprising 
about a third, while nuclear power provides about a fifth, renewables 
                                                
243  See, e.g., FERC Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35); see also Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause 
Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 545, 551 (2005); Welton, supra note 241, at 476–78. 
244  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 721 F.3d 
764, 764 (7th Cir. 2013); Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy 
Reg. Comm’n, 373 F.3d 1361, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also What are 
RTOs and Organized Markets?, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASS’N, 
https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=rto (last visited Jan. 28, 2017); 
The Role of ISOs and RTOs, ISO/RTO COUNCIL, 
http://www.isorto.org/about/Role (last visited Apr. 25, 2017); Clinton A. 
Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 
27 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2006). 
245 See Abaccus, supra note 242, at 8. 
246 Electric Sales, Revenue, and Average Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., 1, Table 10 (Oct. 16, 2016), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table10.pdf.  
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comprise 13%, and petroleum accounts for about 1%.247  As Figure 4 
details, however, there is substantial geographic diversity in how 
electricity is produced in the U.S. today.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
247 Frequently Asked Questions: What is U.S. Electricity Generation 
by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3. 
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FIGURE 4. U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY REGION AND 
SOURCE – 2016248 
 
In short, then, what best typifies the electricity sector in the U.S. 
is complexity at the national level in terms of how the sector operates 
and is governed, and divergence at the state level in terms of how 
that governance and operation is implemented.  Those trends also 
play out in how the United States has chosen to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from electricity use. 
 
B.  DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY 
Despite being responsible for a sizeable portion of global 
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greenhouse gas emissions,249 the United States’ leadership on climate 
change has been quite tenuous over time.  This can be seen perhaps 
most readily in the nation’s interface with global climate change 
mitigation efforts.  While the United States joined 153 other 
countries in ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 1992250—the Kyoto Protocol, as it 
is more commonly known—the country failed to take further action 
five years later when the world made its first concrete effort to 
implement that agreement.  Instead, President Clinton never 
submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification because it 
appeared clear it would fail in that chamber.251  This was part of why 
so many subsequent efforts were necessary to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol at the international level:  one of the biggest contributors to 
GHGs failed to put enforceable regulatory mechanisms in place.252  
Eventually, those efforts climaxed at the end of 2015 with the 
creation of the Paris Accord.253  Again, the United States joined the 
                                                
249 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Emissions by Country, U. S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 6, 2016), 
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252  Quirin Schiermeier, The Kyoto Protocol: Hot Air, NATURE (Nov. 
28, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/the-kyoto-protocol-hot-air-1.11882.  
253  Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (last updated Dec. 12, 2016), 
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agreement but did not send it to the Senate for ratification, with 
President Obama taking the position that because it was not a new 
treaty, but rather merely an “extension of existing obligations” under 
the UNFCCC, it did not require Senate advice and consent, and could 
simply be implemented via executive order.254  
This kind of international ambivalence toward climate change is 
reflective of the fractured public perception of the problem 
domestically.  While a significant portion of U.S. residents favor 
action on climate change, many oppose it, with some of those 
denying that climate change even exists or that human actions are 
driving it.255  As recent surveys have indicated, 65% of Americans 
worry about climate change a great deal or a fair amount, with the 
same portion of the population blaming human activity for rising 
temperatures.256  But only 45% of Americans consider climate 
change a very serious problem.257  Moreover, 16% of U.S. residents 
do not believe there is solid scientific evidence to support a finding 
that climate change is caused by humans.258 
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In turn, these public divisions over climate change have 
translated into legislative gridlock at the federal level.259  From 1999 
to 2014, over 1,163 climate-oriented bills were introduced in 
Congress; however, no comprehensive legislation was enacted.260   
This was not for lack of trying.  Most prominent among these 
failed efforts was the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009, also known as H.R. 2454 or the Waxman-Markey Bill.  This 
bill would have established an economy-wide, greenhouse gas cap-
and-trade system, with a goal of reducing GHG emissions by 17% 
from 2005 levels by 2020, and 83% by 2050.261  Although Waxman-
Markey passed the House of Representatives by a 219-to-212 vote in 
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June 2009, the bill then languished in the Senate,262 effectively 
ending action on climate legislation for the 111th Congress.263 
In the vacuum created by Congress’ failure to adopt 
comprehensive climate legislation, two key efforts have been made 
to address the problem in the United States.  First, states and other 
subnational forms of government have stepped into the breach, 
adopting a wide array of policies of their own.264  Second, at the 
federal level, Congress has passed a number of measures that deal 
with climate change around the edges and, more prominently, the 
Obama administration invoked its executive power to address climate 
change directly.  Of course, with the Obama administration now out 
of office, the future of its extensive legacy on climate action is very 
much in doubt, particularly following issuance of the Trump 
administration’s March 28, 2017 executive order on climate 
change.265  
 
1. SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION 
Subnational action on climate change in the U.S. electricity 
sector can be divided into five primary categories:  efforts to 
(1) establish greenhouse gas emission targets or industry-specific 
limits; (2) mandate GHG emissions reporting;266 (3) impose 
renewable energy production targets; (4) encourage GHG emission 
reductions through energy efficiency measures; and (5) develop 
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climate change adaptation plans.267  As a complement to these 
individual strategies, many states have banded together to cooperate 
regionally in an effort to drive down GHG emissions. 
First, some states have established GHG emission reduction 
objectives, doing so in two primary ways:  through economy-wide 
emission targets or by imposing GHG emission reduction limits on 
the energy sector specifically.268  Of these, economy-wide emission 
targets are the most common.269  For instance, California has set 
economy-wide GHG emission targets to revert to 1990 levels by 
2020.270  By contrast, in New York, new or expanded baseload plants 
(25 MW and larger) must meet an emission rate of either 925 lbs 
CO2/MWh (output-based) or 120 lbs CO2/MMBTU (input-based), 
while non-baseload plants must meet an emission rate of either 1450 
lbs CO2/MWh (output-based) or 160 lbs CO2/MMBTU (input-
based).271  In all, nineteen states have adopted economy-wide 
emission targets, and fourteen states have adopted GHG emission 
standards for the electricity sector.272 
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regions/policy-maps/electricity-emissions-caps.  
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Second, and less aggressively, states have adopted policies 
requiring major source polluters, including the electricity sector, to 
report their greenhouse gas emissions.  Twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia are part of the Climate Registry, a tool to 
measure, track, verify, and publicly report greenhouse gas emissions 
consistently and transparently between states.273  In New Mexico, for 
instance, all major sources that have potential to emit more than 100 
tons/year of criteria pollutants are required to report their CO2, 
methane, and nitrous oxide emissions to the EPA or to New 
Mexico’s Air Quality Bureau.274 
Third, more than two-thirds of states have imposed requirements 
on their electric utilities to produce a given percentage of power from 
renewable energy resources.275  While these renewable portfolio 
standards are not climate change mitigation tools per se, combatting 
climate change is clearly one of the key goals that they embody.  
Moreover, RPSs epitomize other subnational climate legislation in 
the United States in their sheer diversity.276  Indeed, these laws vary 
from state to state in how much renewable generation they require,277 
when such goals must be met,278 and whether they target only least-
cost renewables or also seek to promote more emergent technologies 
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like solar,279 to name just a few RPS design features that differ 
significantly across jurisdictions.280  Notwithstanding this variety, 
RPSs have had a meaningful impact on climate mitigation in the 
United States:  the U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that 
RPSs contributed “$2.2 billion in benefits . . . from reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions and $5.2 billion from reductions in other 
air pollution” in 2013 alone.281  Today, twenty-nine states, the 
District of Columbia, and three territories have adopted mandatory 
RPSs, while eight states and one territory have adopted voluntary 
RPSs, or “renewable portfolio goals” (RPGs).282 
Fourth, states have adopted a number of measures aimed at 
promoting efficiency in electricity use.283  These include setting new 
minimum efficiency standards for appliances and lighting,284 
implementing construction standards and building codes for new 
buildings, and encouraging onsite generation, also known as 
distributed generation.285  Today, twenty-six states have Energy 
Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) in place, which impose 
efficiency targets similar to how RPSs impose renewable energy 
production quotas.286  In 2015, savings from electricity efficiency 
programs totaled approximately 26.5 million megawatt-hours 
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285  See State Energy Efficiency Policy, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
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(MWh), a 3.1% increase over 2014.287  This was the equivalent of 
reducing total retail electricity sales by about 0.7%.288  
Fifth, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted—or established processes for adopting—broader climate 
change adaption plans.289  These plans typically include research and 
education, as well as planning to improve societal resilience to 
climate change, incuding the idea of climate change adaptation.290  
On the electricity side of the ledger, some states, like California, are 
recommending that utilities formulate vulnerability assessments and 
resilience plans as the first steps towards climate change mitigation 
efforts.291  Others, like New Jersey, are making additional 
infrastructure investments to increase resiliency against extreme 
weather events.292  In total, twenty-nine states have included 
electricity policies or recommendations in their climate change 
adaption plans, ranging from RPSs for sources used in electricity 
generation to retrofitting traditional electricity facilities and reducing 
electricity waste.293 
Beyond these state efforts, many jurisdictions have banded 
together to form regional climate change collaborations.  There are 
six current regional or multi-state climate initiatives in the United 
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States,294 all primarily designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and spur public and private investment in clean energy, energy 
efficiency, and sustainable infrastructure.  The Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), comprised of Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont, was the first cooperative effort to cap 
and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.295  In an effort to 
reduce GHG emissions, each participating state created individual 
CO2 Budget Trading Programs and independent regulations, based on 
the RGGI Model Rule and the Summary of RGGI Model Rule 
Changes.296  These programs limit CO2 emissions from electric 
power plants, set CO2 allowances, and frame participation in regional 
CO2 allowance auctions.297  In 2012, the RGGI set a cap of ninety-
one million short tons of CO2 equivalent, with the cap declining 2.5% 
each year from 2015 through 2020.298  In all, RGGI cut CO2 
emissions by 36%, or fifty million short tons, from 2008 to 2014.299  
The other regional initiatives include:  the Western Climate Initiative, 
the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, North American 
2050, the Pacific Coast Collaborative, and the Transportation and 
Climate Initiative.300  While most of these operate similarly to the 
RGGI, there is variety among the groups, with some focusing on 
low-carbon development301 and others on reducing greenhouse gases 
in the transportation sector302 or coordinating collaboration with 
multiple regional initiatives.303  
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2. FEDERAL CLIMATE ACTION 
As states rose up to address climate change, federal action also 
eventually came, primarily through President Obama’s executive 
action in the absence of comprehensive climate regulation.  This 
federal action falls into two broad categories with respect to the 
electricity sector:  (1) direct regulation and (2) indirect regulation. 
Direct federal regulation of the electricity sector’s climate 
emissions began in 2013, under the Obama administration’s umbrella 
Climate Action Plan (CAP).304  This plan established the goal of 
cutting the 2005 carbon pollution levels by 17% by 2020.305  For 
electricity, President Obama directed the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to build on “the successful first-term effort 
to develop greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for cars and 
trucks” and “state leadership” in order “to work expeditiously to 
complete carbon pollution standards for both new and existing power 
plants” and to “double renewable electricity generation once again by 
2020.”306  Thus, the EPA began putting in place a number of 
programs and new regulatory initiatives to achieve this goal.  The 
EPA primarily relied on the Clean Air Act (CAA) to implement these 
programs, which, in 2007, the Supreme Court held covers GHG 
emissions.307 
The first of these regulatory initiatives were the so-called “new 
source” rules, which apply CO2 emissions standards to new, 
modified, and reconstructed facilities, including power plants.308  
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Developed under Section 111(b) of the CAA, the new source rules 
impose emissions performance standards to achieve “the best system 
of emission reduction (BSER)” available for “each type of unit.”309  
Specifically, the new source rules set separate standards for both new 
natural gas and new coal plants.  For the former, the rules limit 
emissions to “no more than 1,000 lbs” of CO2/MWh, and for the 
latter, to “no more than 1,400 lbs” CO2/MWh.310  Effectively, this 
means that new coal plants cannot be built in the United States 
without employing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.311 
On the heels of the new source rules, the EPA also promulgated 
regulations addressing existing power plants.  These rules—known 
more commonly as the Clean Power Plan (CPP)—were finalized in 
August 2015 and seek to reduce CO2 emissions from existing fossil 
fuel-fired power plants by 32% by 2030.312  The CPP set this target 
on a state-by-state basis, using three “building blocks” for CO2 
emission reductions that it said meets the CAA’s BSER standard:313  
improving the heat rate of existing coal-fired power plants, 
substituting lower emission generation (i.e., natural gas) for higher 
emitting generation (i.e., coal), and increasing electricity generation 
from new zero-emitting renewable energy sources.314  Although the 
EPA used these building blocks to establish emissions targets, states 
are free to use any strategy to reduce their emissions, including 
energy efficiency and nuclear generation.315  States must develop 
plans to reach compliance with the CPP, and those plans must be 
approved by the EPA.  In establishing their plans, states may choose 
whether to meet the mass-based or rate-based emission goals set 
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forth in the CPP.316  Although the CPP was initially met with 
enthusiastic fanfare from the U.S. environmental community, it was 
immediately challenged in court,317 with the Supreme Court taking 
the extraordinary step of staying the rule on February 9, 2016.318 
At the same time the federal government was adopting measures 
to directly regulate climate emissions from the electricity sector, a 
bevy of other federal rules also began to impact the way—and the 
level at which—the sector produces GHG emissions.  Key among 
these is the EPA’s 2011 Mercury and Air Toxic Standard (MATS), 
which limits the emission of mercury, acid gases, and other toxic 
pollutants from power plants.319  Although not a climate regulatory 
tool per se, these limits clearly have impacted GHG emissions in the 
United States.  Since the rule targets air pollution from coal- and oil-
fired power plants,320 it is projected that 60 GW of coal-fired capacity 
subject to MATS will retire between 2012 and 2020.321 
Likewise, the United States has a number of other longstanding 
federal measures in place that influence GHG emissions from the 
electricity sector by promoting production of power from renewable 
energy sources.  These measures include the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, which provides incentive 
rates to renewable energy producers, although the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 significantly circumscribed the scope of this law.322  Also 
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relevant are tax incentives for renewable electricity production, most 
prominently an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) benefiting solar 
technology, fuel cells, and small wind turbines,323 and a Production 
Tax Credit (PTC) for a wider array of renewables.324  The current tax 
credit regime has worked best for more “mature industries that 
generate steady flows of taxable income to offset,” although some 
have called for tax credit reform that will more effectively promote 
renewable energy.325 
Despite these efforts to combat climate change taken during the 
Obama administration, there is now significant question whether any 
of these measures will persist.  On November 9, 2016, Donald J. 
Trump was elected as the forty-fifth president of the United States.  
While details of his energy policies are only beginning to emerge, 
from the outset it has been clear that the new administration will seek 
to abruptly discontinue President Obama’s climate initiatives.  Prior 
to the election, Donald Trump suggested via social media that 
“Global warming is a total, and very expensive, hoax!”326  As Mr. 
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Trump tweeted on November 6, 2012, “The concept of global 
warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. 
manufacturing non-competitive.”327  Then, during his campaign for 
the White House, Mr. Trump pledged to “rescind all the job-
destroying Obama executive actions including the Climate Action 
Plan” and “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all 
payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global warming programs.”328  
Following the inauguration, the Trump administration appeared 
unready to back down from these promises, pledging on the White 
House home page to “eliminat[e] harmful and unnecessary policies 
such as the Climate Action Plan . . . and to reviv[e] America’s coal 
industry, which has been hurting for too long.”329  Meanwhile, the 
new administration has methodically removed mentions of climate 
change, the Paris Accord, and the Obama Climate Action plan from 
EPA websites.330 
Yet, precisely how the new administration will proceed remains 
unclear.  Shortly after the election, then-President-Elect Trump noted 
that there is “‘some connectivity’ between human activity and rising 
global temperatures,” and he suggested that he would keep “an open 
mind” concerning the United States’ involvement to Paris climate 
accord.331  Moreover, while presidents have much latitude in setting 
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policy agendas, regulations already in place cannot be simply spirited 
away, as the repeal of rules is subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).332  Nonetheless, and 
notwithstanding the limits of the APA and the risk of judicial review, 
on March 28, 2017, the Trump administration issued an executive 
order directly targeting the Obama-era climate rules.  The executive 
order mandates all agency heads to “review all existing regulations, 
orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency 
actions . . . . that potentially burden the development or use of 
domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to 
oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.”333  The idea, of 
course, is that such review will lead to modification or recission of 
Executive Branch rules addressing climate emissions, including from 
the electricity sector.  Indeed, the executive order affirmately 
rescinds a number of President Obama’s climate actions, including 
the Climate Action Plan itself as well as his June 25, 2013 
presidential memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution 
Standards.334  Further, the executive order directs the EPA 
administrator to review the final rule implementing the Clean Power 
Plan and “if appropriate, . . . as soon as practicable, suspend, revise, 
or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed 
rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules.”335 
 
C.  CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Although the United States recently has taken a number of 
prominent measures, both federal and sub-federal, to address climate 
change emissions from the electricity sector, the impact of these 
policies is not as clear.  Further, because the new presidential 
administration has already cast a large shadow over the Obama 
administration’s climate change efforts, even more uncertainty exists 
about what the future of climate regulation in the U.S. electricity 
sector will be. 
One thing that is clear is that how the United States produces 
electricity has changed significantly over the last decade in at least 
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two regards.  First, the use of coal for electricity production has 
decreased substantially, while natural gas has made up a good portion 
of that difference.  Thus, as Figure 5 details, coal comprised 50% or 
more of U.S. electricity production from 1991 through 2005, but the 
next year, it dipped to 49%, and it has not ticked back up above that 
marker since.  In 2016, coal fell to a modern low, making up only 
30% of U.S. electric generation.  At the same time, natural gas use 
has steadily risen.  That fuel, which previously had been banned for 
use in electricity production,336 comprised between 12% and 19% of 
generation between 1991 and 2005, finally breaking the 20% mark in 
2005.  By 2015, it matched coal’s role, accounting for 33% of 
electricity production, and in 2016, it surpassed the amount of 
generation from coal, comprising 34% of the nation’s electricity 
production.  This is important from a climate change perspective 
because CO2 emissions from natural gas are roughly 50 to 60 percent 
lower than from coal. 
Second, renewable energy use has steadily risen in the last 
decade, albeit not as dramatically as has natural gas.  While 
hydropower has remained relatively constant, ranging from 9% of 
production in 1991 to 7% in 2016—and while nuclear also has quite 
consistently contributed about one-fifth of U.S. production—non-
hydro renewables have increased their share of generation year over 
year, like gas, also beginning around 2006.  Until that year, non-
hydro renewables accounted for 2% of production.  Beginning in 
2007, however, renewables made up 3% of production, and in 2016 
comprised over 8%—notably, more than hydropower. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
336  See Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Fuel Use 
Act), Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.), repealed in relevant part, Pub. L. No. 100-42, § 1, 101 Stat. 
310 (1987). 
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FIGURE 5. U.S. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY SOURCE OVER 
TIME337 
 
                                                
337  This figure is based on historical data aggregated from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration’s Electric Power Monthly Reports (Table 
1.1 Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Secotrs)) and Electricity 
Data Browser.  See Electric Power Monthly, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/ (last visited May 21, 2017); 
Electricty Data Browser, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/0?agg=2,0,1&fuel=vvg
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Importantly, while lower GHG-emitting sources, like natural gas 
and renewables, have been growing in prominence in the United 
States, and higher emitting sources, namely coal, have been 
diminishing, it is not clear that the shifts in American electricity 
generation hinge on climate regulation as such.338  Rather, the sharp 
uptick in natural gas use is clearly linked to two key, non-climate-
related trends:  the opening up of the wholesale electricity market to 
competition in the 1990s and, even more critically, the shale gas 
boom from the rise of hydraulic fracturing technology in this century, 
which drove natural gas prices to historic lows.  The cold facts of 
these economics encouraged electricity producers to use more gas 
and less coal, with some large utilities affirmatively retrofitting 
existing coal facilities to burn gas instead.  Likewise, while the 
growth of non-hydro renewables appears to be driven at least in part 
by the adoption of pro-renewable laws like RPSs or the extension of 
pertinent tax credits, those laws must be characterized as only 
partially climate regulatory measures.  Drops in renewable 
technology costs also clearly are playing a role in the growth of these 
resources, particularly solar and wind. 
It should not be surprising, then, that even as lower-GHG 
generation sources grew in stature in the American electricity 
generation fleet, the proportion of GHG emissions coming from the 
U.S. electricity sector did not decrease.  The electricity sector has 
accounted for the largest portion of net U.S. GHG emissions in every 
year since 1990, when the EPA began reporting numbers:  33% in 
1990, 37% in 2005, 33% in 2010, and 34% in 2014.339  Still, changes 
in the electricity generation fleet are reflected in that sector’s GHG 
emissions.  U.S. electricity sector emissions peaked in 2007, at 
2454.1 MMT CO2 equivalent, and have decreased every year since 
then, reaching as low as 2060.7 in 2012 and 2080.7 in 2014—the 
smallest total for the sector since 1996–97.340  This is because 
                                                
338  See, e.g., Vaclav Smil, Trump’s coal policy will likely do just what 
Obama’s did , THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-coal-policy-will-likely-
do-just-what-obamas-did/2017/03/29/7c5bb868-14b4-11e7-9e4f-
09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utm_term=.214d75464d1f. 
339  See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:  1990-
2014, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-04/documents/us-ghg-
inventory-2016-main-text.pdf. 
340  See id. 
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growing consumption, driven in large part by growing population, is 
one of the key factors keeping emissions from the electricity sector at 
such a high proportional level. 
 
VI.  THE SHAPE OF CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY:  
EMERGING LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE 
Although there are clear limits in what lessons can be drawn 
about the scope and trajectory of climate regulation internationally 
from four case studies, a comparison of the experiences in Australia, 
Great Britain, Korea, and the United States has much to teach.  While 
understanding climate regulation of the electricity sector in these 
jurisdictions does not give a comprehensive picture of law and policy 
efforts worldwide, it does provide a useful, and somewhat expansive, 
view of both the types of regulatory tools in use and the impact these 
devices are having.  Thus, such a comparision also gives some 
perspective on the overall shape of climate regulation in the 
electricity sector, both extant and potential, worldwide. 
Gaining this cross-jurisdictional perspective is useful for a 
number of reasons, including that jurisdictions may wish to borrow 
tools from each other, may choose not to implement a given policy 
when it is clear it has failed elsewhere, and may improve how they 
regulate by learning from others’ experiences.  Moreover, the use of 
policy devices and their effects in Australia, the United Kingdom, 
South Korea, and the United States align remarkably well in a range 
of respects, thus highlighting several generalizations worth noting 
about climate regulation of the electricity sector. 
Most conspicuous of these is that these jurisdictions adopted a 
diverse set of measures to address climate emissions in their 
electricity sectors.  This should make sense given the equally diverse 
set of political, physical, economic, and social contexts in which 
jurisdictions regulate.  But at the same time, each of the jurisdictions 
surveyed underwent significant—and rapid—change in their policies.  
That such policy change is so prevalent reveals a third lesson offered 
by the case studies, namely, that climate regulation is bound to be 
influenced by a wide array of outside forces, just as the electricity 
sector itself is.  Finally, the overall design, including the design 
details, of this regulation appear to matter very much, something that 
should stay at the forefront of the conversation as lawmakers 
continue to evolve their regulatory programs over time. 
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A.  POLICY DIVERSITY 
It should come as little surprise that the variety of regulatory 
tools used to address GHG emissions in the electricity sector is quite 
wide, even when looking at just four jurisdictions.  While all four of 
the countries surveyed are heavily industrialized and major economic 
players on the world stage, these jurisdictions also differ in a number 
of key respects.  The socio-political cultures of Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Korea, and the United States are somewhat divergent.  The 
countries had very different fuel mixes heading into their efforts to 
impose climate regulation on their electricity sectors.  And while 
competition is prevalent in three of the countries (Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States), one utilizes a state-
sponsored utility that runs much like a monopoly to provide power to 
its citizens (Korea).341  Policy diversity, in short, should be expected. 
Nonetheless, the amount of diversity among the four 
jurisdictions is noteworthy.  Australia currently uses a voluntary 
emissions reduction scheme,342 while the UK has a legally binding 
GHG reduction target and participates in the EU emissions trading 
scheme as part of its effort to meet its EU emissions reductions 
obligation.343  By contrast, the United States failed to adopt any 
comprehensive climate scheme at the national level, neither a trading 
scheme nor a carbon tax,344 even as Korea instituted the first national 
cap-and-trade mechanism for GHG emissions in Asia.345 
Similarly, these countries employed a variety of different policy 
devices to promote renewable energy, all in part as a way to reduce 
climate emissions, although it is noteworthy that all four of the 
countries have used quota mechanisms, such as RPSs, while feed-in 
tariffs were more popular across the globe.  Australia uses what is 
effectively a two-part renewable portfolio standard requirement,346 
and Korea likewise implemented a system-wide renewable energy 
mandate in the same vein.347 The UK previously imposed a similar 
Renewable Obligation, but it is now phasing that mechanism out in 
favor of a tendering regime referred to as “contracts for 
                                                
341  See supra Parts II–V. 
342  Supra Part II.B. 
343  Supra Part III.B. 
344  Supra Part V.B. 
345  Supra Part IV.B. 
346  Supra Part II.B. 
347  Supra Part IV.B. 
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difference,”348 with some feed-in tariffs in place for smaller 
renewables.  Meanwhile, the United States repeatedly failed to adopt 
a nationwide RPS but instead relied on widespread, but not uniform, 
state laws, federal tax credits, and piecemeal implementation of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, a precursor to modern feed-in 
tariffs, and that, today, now looks much like a watered-down version 
of a FIT.349 
The United States, indeed, stands apart from Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and Korea in several respects in its approach to 
climate regulation for its focus on subnational rather than federal 
efforts.  While there are certainly criticisms that can be leveled 
against the policies of the other jurisdictions, they at least have taken 
the first step of developing and implementing a coordinated, national 
approach to reducing GHG emissions from the electricity sector.  The 
United States, instead, relies heavily on uncoordinated state (and 
sometimes regional) policies, which by definition leave large swaths 
of the country’s electricity sector untouched by climate regulation.350  
The Obama Administration sought to plug these holes by adopting 
regulations under the auspices of its Climate Action Plan, but less 
than three full months into the Trump administration, that Plan is 
already on the table to be undone.351 
 
B.  POLICY CONVULSION 
It is somewhat difficult to conjure the correct word to describe 
the course of climate regulation of the electricity sector over the 
relatively short time in which that regulation has applied.  
“Evolution” does not capture the speed of the change; 
“transubstantiation” perhaps overstates the degree to which the 
regulations have morphed.  The phrase “policy convulsion,” then, 
may be a useful if imperfect descriptor, for its conveyance of the idea 
that the climate regulatory regimes in the electricity sector appear to 
be changing sharply, rapidly, and repeatedly. 
                                                
348  Supra Part III.B. 
349  Supra Part V.B; see also Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-in Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 
311 (2012). 
350  See supra Part V.B. 
351  See id. 
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To be sure, each of the four jurisdictions surveyed has already 
seen this change in a number of respects.  Australia went from using 
a quite effective emissions trading scheme, to repealing it, to 
replacing it with its current policy, the Emissions Reduction Fund.352  
In so doing, Australia moved from a mandatory regime to a voluntary 
one, and from a more national policy to one where the subnational 
Australian states and territories are now adopting their own laws to 
help try to fill the gap.353 
Similarly, the UK charted a rather circuitous route as it seeks to 
find the right balance in promoting renewable energy, a key 
component of its effort to bring electricity sector GHG emissions 
down.  That effort began with the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation in 
1990, a bidding regime that was subsequently replaced by the quota-
based Renewable Obligation, which then had added to it feed-in 
tariffs.354  And now, these tools are being phased out to be replaced 
with the CfD, bringing the jurisdiction full circle back to the NFFO 
in many ways, by using auctions to try to meet its renewable energy 
targets.355 
Korea and the United States cut similar pictures by making sharp 
changes to their climate regulation of the electricity sector over time.  
Following the example of many European jurisdictions, Korea 
adopted a feed-in tariff to much fanfare, only to quickly abandon it in 
favor of an RPS.356  Likewise, in the United States a cycle of efforts 
to adopt federal legislation, followed by state innovations to try to 
make up for congressional gridlock, then federal executive action, 
and now likely federal executive withdrawal, mark the very uneven 
path of how that nation has sought to address electricity industry 
climate emissions.357 
Of course, there are socio-political, context-specific reasons for 
each of these changes, reasons that necessarily differ from one 
jurisdiction to the next.  However, the fact that all four of the nations 
surveyed here have already undergone such substantial change in a 
rather short period of time is itself illuminating.  It underscores the 
tentative approach many countries continue to have toward regulating 
                                                
352  See supra Part II.B. 
353  See id. 
354  See supra Part III.B. 
355  See id. 
356  See supra Part IV.B. 
357  See supra Part V.B. 
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climate change, both in the electricity sector and more broadly—and 
the tenuous position of those regulations once they are adopted. 
 
C.  ELECTRICITY SHIFTS AND NON-POLICY FACTORS 
Another lesson made clear by the experience of the four 
jurisdictions surveyed here is that while climate policies certainly can 
have a meaningful impact on the electricity sector, these laws must 
always be understood in the broader context in which they operate.  
That is, other factors besides direct climate regulation clearly 
influence the electricity mix.  This certainly was borne out as each of 
the countries surveyed here began to implement their climate 
regulations, and it perhaps is even more evident as electricity systems 
worldwide are undergoing other significant economic 
transformations today. 
Importantly, external forces influencing the electricity system do 
not necessarily enhance, or restrain, the effectiveness of climate 
regulation.  They cut both ways.  Thus, notwithstanding its climate 
policies, the high cost of importing natural gas compared to coal has 
driven a stronger proportion of the latter resource in Korea’s 
generation mix, and consequently, higher GHG emissions.358  By 
contrast, the United States was able to reduce the proportion of coal 
in its generation fleet, despite its lack of national GHG emissions 
limits, largely because the shale gas boom has made that resource so 
cost-effective and thus attractive to utilities.359 
Similarly, nations must recognize that while their electricity 
systems may be islanded off from other jurisdictions physically, they 
are not isolated from the effects of distant policy decisions.  The 
United Kingdom, for instance, has seen an increase in wind and other 
renewables as policies across Europe have helped make those 
resources more affordable,360 just as the falling cost of solar PV 
following the proliferation of European feed-in tariffs helped 
Australia become a leader in distributed generation.361  Likewise, 
there is clear cross-pollination of policies across jurisdictions.  RPSs 
in the United States, for instance, have become more nuanced in 
                                                
358  See supra Part IV.C. 
359  See supra Part V.C. 
360  Cf. supra Parts III.B.–C. 
361  Cf. supra Part II. 
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recent years, in part to promote solar power, which itself is partially a 
response to highly granular European feed-in tariffs,362 while the 
United Kingdom’s own RO similarly was amended in 2009 to 
become more “banded.”363 
These are but a few aspects of the larger socio-legal-physical 
ecosystem in which climate regulations operate.  Recognizing that 
this ecosystem exists, and influences policy, is a key observation—
and one that this Article’s juxtaposition of these four jurisdictions 
points up well. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that there are commonalities across 
jurisdictions showing the limits to the efficacy of climate regulation.  
Given that many electricity regulatory systems, including the market-
based systems of the jurisdictions studied here, emphasize price as an 
inherent end-goal, recognizing the wider forces at play in how 
electricity systems are developing today is critical.  That is, climate 
regulation does not aim to fundamentally rewrite how energy law or 
utility regulation as a whole operates.  Instead, it seeks only to 
modify or tweak it, giving a “price” of some kind to carbon where 
one did not previously exist.  But in a system where low prices are 
preferred, any effort to increase costs will always remain in tension 
with the larger legal system—and global forces may dictate what 
those costs are, irrespective of what any one nation decides to do 
with its own climate regulation.  All four countries examined here 
have experienced this to some degree. 
 
D.  CLIMATE PERFORMANCE AND POLICY DESIGN 
At the same time that it is clear climate regulation of electricity 
operates in a much larger fabric of physical, economic, and legal 
systems, it is equally plain that the presence of these laws matters.  
Their content matters as well. 
The first point—that climate regulation actually has impacted the 
electricity sector—is perhaps obvious, but it is important 
nevertheless.  It is also consistent with the literature,364 and it is 
                                                
362  Cf. supra Parts V.B.–C. 
363  See supra Part III.B. 
364  William Dean, Interactions Among Market Mechanisms for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California, 29 THE ELECTRICITY J. 
17, 20–22 (2016); Shahrouz Abolhosseini & Almas Heshmati, The Main 
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demonstrated across each of the jurisdictions analyzed here.  Part of 
how the United Kingdom was able to meet its GHG emission target 
emissions, for instance, is by growing the share of both natural gas 
and renewables in its generation mix.365  More dramatically, 
Australia’s former Emissions Trading Scheme drove down the use of 
coal for power production, whereas the lifting of that mandate and its 
replacement with a voluntary scheme led immediately to an uptick in 
coal consumption, as well as the failure of electricity producers to 
participate.366  A more blatant example of the impact of a regulation’s 
influence is hard to imagine. 
Still, simply regulating GHG emissions from electricity is 
unlikely to be enough by itself.  It also matters how those regulations 
are designed and implemented, as the experiences in Australia, the 
UK, Korea, and the United States emphasize.  In the United States, 
for instance, the historically state-by-state nature of climate 
regulation consistently presents the risk that emissions reductions in 
one jurisdiction may simply be offset by emissions growth in another 
jurisdiction367—what some scholars have referred to as “policy 
leakage.”368  Likewise, projections show that what impact the Clean 
Power Plan might have on the electricity mix depends heavily on 
                                                                                           
Support Mechanisms to Finance Renewable Energy Development, 40 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 876, 8801–81, 8884 (2014); 
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365  See supra Part III.C. 
366  See supra Part II. 
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368  See, e.g., Julia Reinaud, International Energy Agency, Climate 
Policy and Carbon Leakage: Impacts of the European Emissions Trading 
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which compliance mechanisms states choose, with natural gas 
growth and efficiency measures in particular having a strong 
interplay.369  Yet perhaps the starkest example of the importance 
electricity climate policy design comes from South Korea.  There, 
because the nation’s RPS defines what counts as “renewable” quite 
broadly, wood pallet imports—rather than homegrown wind or solar 
installations—are serving as the dominant fuel used for regulatory 
compliance.370 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This is the most exciting time to be involved in electricity since 
the dawn of the industry. Much today is changing, rapidly, from 
global electrification to increased competition, from disruption from 
distributed generation to the sudden, unexpected emergence of 
natural gas as not just a “bridge” fuel to a clean energy economy but 
also a dominant force based on economics alone.  The electricity 
industry, it increasingly seems clear, is very much in a time of 
transition. 
There is no doubt that part of this transition is driven by 
governments seeking to quell the rising tide of climate emissions 
from the industry.  From a global perspective, this is a daunting 
enough task, particularly as both general demand growth as well as 
the industrialization and increased electrification of developing and 
other countries means that even major shifts in generation portfolios 
can be easily overwhelmed. 
This Article shows that even for developed, already-
industrialized jurisdictions willing to make concerted efforts to 
reshape electricity generation, achieving meaningful and lasting 
reductions in climate emissions is no easy endeavor.  There are 
myriad policies to choose from; once that choice is made, policy and 
legal change seems inevitable; and climate regulation does not 
operate in a vacuum, but rather, a much larger, messier, and 
complicated socio-legal context—including interactions with 
traditional energy law that in many jurisdictions by its nature 
intrinsically preferences price risk over climate risk. 
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As we look to the future of climate regulation of the electricity 
industry, then, one thing above all else seems certain.  Many 
challenges remain. 
 
